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The money supply composition has shifted towards liquid securities created by financial
intermediaries. However, the recent financial crisis has highlighted the fragility of this source
of liquidity.
Therefore, in the first chapter I create a model where currency, safe liabilities and risky
liabilities all provide liquidity services. During normal times, intermediaries are able to fully
satiate the demand for liquidity. This corresponds to a large drop in liquidity supply during a
crisis because of the defaults from risky liabilities. Nevertheless, a welfare maximizing planner
would like to reduce or eliminate these changes in the supply of liquid asset. Liquidity and
capital requirements can restore efficiency, but they are sensitive to calibration and may be
ineffective when analyzed individually.
In the second chapter, I document some recent trends in the financial industry. Bank holding
companies have deleveraged their balance sheets, while increasing the amounts of issued
deposits. These trends are particularly strong among the largest U.S. banks, while smaller
ones have a balance sheet that resembles a textbook commercial bank. I then calibrate the
model presented in the first chapter using bank level data. The calibrated equilibrium shows
how the structure of the financial sector is unresponsive to changes in the monetary policy
target rate.
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CHAPTER 1
Easy Money: the Inefficient Supply of Inside Liquidity
1.1 Introduction
A commonly held view is that money aggregates should include liquid securities issued by
intermediaries, such as money market deposit accounts. Otherwise, empirical relationships
about these aggregates broke down after the 1980s, as documented in Lucas and Nicol-
ini (2015). Money aggregates should also include other types of liquid securities issued by
intermediaries, such as repo and commercial paper, because they provide liquidity for fi-
nancial transactions (Lucas (1990), Geromichalos, Licari, and Sua´rez-Lledo´ (2007), Bigio
(2015), Herrenbrueck and Geromichalos (2017), Piazzesi and Schneider (2018), and Lagos
and Zhang (2018)). However, the 2008 financial crisis highlighted that the liquid securi-
ties issued by intermediaries differ in an important way from other components of money
aggregate: they entail substantial liquidity risk. Indeed, as the financial system conditions
deteriorated, these securities quickly lost both their value and their ability to provide liquid-
ity services.1 Many have argued that the sudden stop in the provision of liquidity was a key
driver of the Great Recession. The crisis led to a revision of the financial system regulation
with the objective of reducing the financial fragility caused, among other things, by too few
high-quality, liquid assets. The result was the Dodd-Frank act domestically and the Basel
III agreement internationally.
1Gorton and Metrick (2012) and Gorton, Laarits, and Metrick (2018) document this phenomenon in the
repo market
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Motivated by these observations, I study the equilibrium and socially optimal composition
of liquidity supply. Households demand liquid securities to finance their consumption needs.
These liquid securities are supplied by a central bank in the form of fiat currency or by
intermediaries-issued liabilities. Some intermediaries issue safe or riskless liabilities, which
always provide liquidity services.2 Others issue risky liabilities, whose liquidity value is lost
in the event of a default. Therefore, default events are associated with sudden collapses in the
availability of liquidity. The endogenous supply of safe and risky liquidity by intermediaries is
a key feature that distinguishes this work from the previous literature. I find that endogenous
fluctuations in the aggregate supply of liquidity are ex-ante inefficient. Therefore a planner
would implement policies like liquidity or capital requirements with the objective of reducing
defaults in the economy.
Given this framework, I first study the composition of aggregate liquidity resulting from
a competitive market. Every period there are two states of the world. A normal state,
where capital productivity is high. And a bad state, where capital productivity is low and
risky securities default. In an equilibrium in which currency has positive value and only safe
securities are issued, overall real balances adjust to keep the aggregate amount of liquidity
constant. However, in an equilibrium where risky securities are also issued, real balances
adjust to keep only the expected marginal value of liquidity services constant. That is, the
amount of currency, safe liabilities and risky ones changes in order to keep expected benefit
of holding an additional unit of any liquid asset constant. But households’ consumption
is tied to the amount of available liquid securities, so how liquidity is allocated among the
possible states of the economy feeds directly into welfare.
The households’ desire to hold liquid assets is reflected in a liquidity premium that
intermediaries can capture by issuing safe or risky liabilities. However, issuing safe securities
is costly since equity is necessary to be always able to deliver on the promised return.
2See Gorton (2017) for the historical evidence about the liquidity provision of safe assets
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Additional balance sheet costs, like the FDIC insurance, also contribute to increase the cost
of funding with safe liabilities. On the other hand, issuing a risky security is subject to both
a default premium, from the lost value after a default, and to a smaller liquidity premium,
since any liquidity service is lost after default. In equilibrium these effects balance out and
intermediaries issue both safe and risky securities. Furthermore, the amount of liquidity is
so abundant in normal times that household’s demand is fully satiated. This is the first
prediction of the model, as “easy money” is available to satisfy all consumption needs.
A consequence of this equilibrium is that the economy is exposed to liquidity risk, since
intermediaries’ default causes the aggregate amount of liquidity to change over time. In
fact, the second prediction of my model is that these changes in the levels of liquidity are
always inefficient, since the collapse in consumption after risky securities default more than
compensates the increase in consumption in normal times. The externality arises from the
issuance of risky securities. Intermediaries do not internalize that their presence in the market
depresses the amount of safe securities and currency needed to keep the expected marginal
amount of liquidity constant. A welfare maximizing planner would generally prefer to fully
equalize the amount of available liquidity across states or at least decrease its variability
compared to the competitive equilibrium.
This inefficiency creates a role for government intervention through regulation. The
third contribution of this paper is to study the impact of liquidity and capital requirements
as revised in the Basel III agreement. While global compliance is voluntary, both the Federal
Reserve and the European Union have implemented the accord as part of the financial system
regulatory reforms.
In this model, liquidity requirements mandate intermediaries to back up a fraction of
their liabilities with government issued currency. I find that they can increase welfare and
take the economy to the planner’s solution when appropriately designed. Nevertheless, a
necessary condition to achieve efficiency is to impose stricter requirements on the issuers
3
of risky securities. Intuitively, the planner would like to discourage the issuance of risky
liabilities and therefore make it more expensive to issue them.
Similarly, capital requirements direct intermediaries to issue an amount of equity equal
to at least a given fraction of their assets. I find that they can increase welfare when the
requirements are sufficiently large. However, they are not necessarily effective in steering
the economy towards the desired allocation of liquidity. That is, multiple equilibria exist
after the implementation of the policy. The economy can either transition to the welfare-
improving equilibrium or stay in the same inefficient equilibrium where “easy money” is
readily available.
Related Literature
My work is related to the new monetarist literature started by Lagos and Wright (2005), in
which households demand liquid assets for transaction services. While this literature focuses
on micro-foundations for valued fiat currency, I take a reduced from approach similar to
Lucas and Stokey (1987) to focus on the role of intermediaries. Within this class of models,
Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) study how money and capital can be a competing medium of
exchange. Their analysis is further refined in Gu, Mattesini, Monnet, and Wright (2013)
and Gu, Mattesini, and Wright (2016), whose work focuses on the role of banking and credit
in expanding the set of feasible allocations. In particular, Gu et al. (2016) compare money
with credit to show how real balances adjust to keep the amount of liquidity constant.3
My framework provides a similar result, with the additional feature that intermediaries can
default on their liabilities.4 In this context, the key equilibrium condition is that the expected
marginal value of liquidity is constant, implying that liquidity can fluctuate across states and
create a welfare loss. Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2016) consider an economy where an
3Lacker and Schreft (1996) look at a similar problem, but where money and credit have different user
cost.
4These liabilities are claims backed by a risky asset, as in Lagos (2011).
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illiquid asset can be exchanged for a liquid one in a frictional search model. Similarly,
my model includes securities that can provide liquidity and therefore demand a liquidity
premium that increases with inflation. Finally, Andolfatto, Berentsen, and Waller (2016)
study monetary policy where money is backed by an illiquid capital, which is exactly the
type of asset-backed security that intermediaries intermediaries issue in my model.
This paper also relates to a long literature in the creation and demand for liquidity, start-
ing from the work in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998) address
whether governments should create or regulate liquidity to stimulate efficient investment.
Eisfeldt (2004), Bigio (2015) and Kurlat (2017) identify adverse selection as the key ele-
ments for asset illiquidity. Bianchi and Bigio (2017) then look at how intermediaries manage
their liquidity risk and how monetary policy affects the issuance of credit. I combine all
of this work to inform a stylized model where securities can lose their liquidity properties.
Finally, Benigno and Robatto (2018) consider the efficient supply of liquidity when safe gov-
ernment bonds5 are available together with safe and risky securities from intermediaries.6
They then study tax based policies to correct potential inefficiencies. This paper follows
their base framework, while using fiat currency as the asset of choice for the public supply of
liquidity. This lets me address different regulatory policies that have not been studied from
a consumption based point of view.
The safe assets literature (such as Caballero and Farhi (2017); Diamond (2016); Farhi
and Maggiori (2017); Li (2017); Magill et al. (2016); Stein (2012); and Woodford (2001))
has modeled how these assets provide liquidity services. Given this setting, I extend the
liquidity provision property to risky assets as well, as long as the economy is in the good
state. Gorton and Metrick (2012) show how risky assets quickly lose their liquidity value in
5Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) document how the treasury bond market is driven by the
demand for safe and liquid assets.
6Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet (2016) consider the case where only private debt provides liquidity service
and analyze the consequences for monetary policy.
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the repo market during the 2008 financial crisis.
My results also point out that there might be an excessive amount of credit, as in Loren-
zoni (2008) and Moreira and Savov (2017). Furthermore, the inefficiency can be understood
as a lack of safe assets, whose effects have been studied in Caballero (2006) and Caballero
and Farhi (2017). These papers all stress the importance of fiscal capacity to implement
active policies, while I focus my attention on the outcomes from regulation that does not
require direct government intervention.
1.2 Environment
Time is discrete over an infinite horizon. As in the new monetarist models pioneered in Lagos
and Wright (2005), each time period is divided into two sub-periods, morning and evening.
There is a single consumption good, which is produced in the morning of every period and
can be freely stored until the evening, after which it fully depreciates. Production transforms
a fixed and non depreciating supply of capital K¯ into the consumption good through a linear
technology Yt = AtK¯, where At is an aggregate shock on capital productivity and the only
source of uncertainty in the model. The shocks are independent and identically distributed
according to
At =

Ah with probability 1− pi
A` with probability pi
,
with Ah > A`. Define A¯ ≡ (1− pi)Ah + piA` as the average productivity of capital. In what
follows, I will refer to a realization of Ah as the good or high state and a realization of A` as
the bad or low state.
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative household, a central bank,
and a continuum of two-period lived, overlapping generations of intermediaries. The central
bank controls the supply of fiat currency, Mt, through lump-sum transfers to households.
6
Intermediaries manage capital, while supplying debt securities and equity in the economy.
The household cannot manage capital,7 thus it invests in intermediaries to transfer resources
intertemporally. Furthermore, the household is subject to a liquidity constraint, where it
must finance its morning consumption with a combination of currency and securities. These
two securities are not perfect substitutes when it comes to their liquidity value. First, only
a fraction θ of a security face value can be used to finance morning consumption. Second, a
security may be defaulted upon in the bad state, in which case it looses all of its liquidity
value and cannot be used in morning transactions. However, a default does not imply a
total loss for the security holder, since the value of the assets backing the security can still
be recovered in the evening.8
I assume that intermediaries honor their obligations as long as they are below the value of
the assets in the balance sheet. Consequently, a default event in this model occurs whenever
the asset side of an intermediary’s balance sheet is insufficient to cover the issued securities
face value. For clarity of exposition, I will call the intermediary issuing of a safe security
“commercial bank” and the issuer of a risky security “shadow bank”. The corresponding
securities will be denoted as bc and bs respectively. To create a safe security, the commercial
bank will have to issue equity nc, so that the limited liability constraint is never binding.
Table 1.1 summarizes the timing of the model. At the beginning of the morning the
aggregate shock realizes, resolving all uncertainty for the time period. Therefore, production
occurs and all prices are determined, so that the household can make its morning consump-
tion choice. Then in the afternoon, a new generation of bankers is born and the central bank
makes the lump-sum monetary transfer. Subsequently, the household makes its portfolio
choice, so that the new generation of bankers can acquire capital from the old generation of
7That is, the household has an infinitely high management cost for capital. A similar setup can be found
in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and in Gertler and Karadi (2011).
8Intermediaries securities can be interpreted as collateralized loans, as in Gorton and Ordonez (2014).
Thus, in the event of a default, the borrower can still obtain the value of the collateral.
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Morning Evening
• Aggregate shock is publicly observed
• Production
• Prices & default determined
• Household’s morning consumption
• New generation of intermediaries enters
• Lump sum monetary transfer
• Household’s evening consumption and
portfolio choice
• Old generation of intermediaries dies
Table 1.1: Model Timing
bankers.
1.2.1 Household’s Problem
Household’s preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear per period utility over morning
and evening consumption9
Ut = log c
am
t + c
pm
t .
Morning consumption camt is subject to a liquidity constraint: the household can use only
currency or securities to finance morning consumption. The two assets are imperfect sub-
stitutes in terms of their liquidity value. While currency can be freely used to finance any
morning transaction, securities use is subject to two constraints. First, I assume that only
a fraction 0 < θ < 1 of the face value of a security can be immediately redeemed. That
9The log utility is a useful device to recover closed form solutions, but the results of this paper can be
extended to a more general quasi-linear utility U = u (cam) + cpm, where u (·) is an increasing and concave
function that satisfies standard Inada conditions.
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is, securities provide less liquidity services than fiat currency.10 Barnett (1982) argues that
different securities provide different amount of liquidity services, as measured by their user
cost, and this should be taken into account when measuring aggregate liquidity. Second,
securities come into two different varieties. Some securities are risk free, thus they will never
be defaulted upon. Others are risky, and will be subject to default in the bad state. If that
is the case, the defaulted security loses its liquidity value and cannot be used in morning
transactions. While this might look as a stark assumption, since it ignores any secondary
market or debt collection services that may be available for defaulted securities, it is a useful
simplification to highlight the main forces of the model. Furthermore, it is the case that
liquidity of an asset deteriorates quickly as its rating declines, as documented in Benmelech
and Bergman (2018).
The morning liquidity constraint can therefore be written as
camt ≤ ϕtMt−1 + θ
(
1 + rct−1
)
bct−1 + θ (1− It)
(
1 + rst−1
)
bst−1, (1.1)
where It is an indicator function such that It = 1 when the shadow bank defaults on its
securities. Taking the morning consumption as the numeraire good, the real value of a unit
of money is denoted by ϕt.
The asset timing follows the cash-in-advance and new monetarist tradition. The asset
allocations that determine the morning liquidity constraint need to be made in the previous
period, before the aggregate capital productivity realizes. The household lends bct−1 to the
commercial bank and its first order condition pin down the equilibrium interest rate 1+rct−1.
Another way to interpret these amounts is to normalize the price of the liability to one at
issuance. Then 1 + rct−1 represents the face value of an equivalent zero coupon bond issued
by the commercial bank and bct−1 is the quantity issued. The same holds true for a shadow
bank issued security bst−1.
10This is a also a common assumption in the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) literature and in new monetarist
models with multiple sources of liquidity, like Lagos and Rocheteau (2008).
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Once the period moves forward to the evening, the household makes its evening con-
sumption and asset allocation decisions subject to a budget constraint
cpmt + ϕtMt + b
s
t + b
c
t + n
c
t ≤ Wt + Tt, (1.2)
where Wt is the household’s wealth at the beginning of the evening, which can be expressed
as
Wt = ϕtMt−1 +
(
1 + rct−1
)
bct−1 + (1− χt)
(
1 + rst−1
)
bst−1 + (1 + r
n
t )n
c
t−1 − camt , (1.3)
That is, household wealth is defined by the value of the assets carried over from the previous
period minus the amount used for morning consumption. The transfer Tt includes the
real value of the monetary transfer from the central bank and any taxation levied on the
intermediaries and then rebated to the household. The monetary component of the lump-
sum transfer implements the desired monetary policy, either as a helicopter drop if the
central bank is expanding the available currency in circulation or as a tax if currency is
reduced.11 The realized return return on commercial bank equity is denoted as rnt . This
is a random variable and determined as a residual from the intermediaries’ profits, as I will
detail in the following section. Finally, 1− χt represents the recovery rate of a security that
might default. If no default happens, then the full face value of the risky security is paid
and χt = 0. If instead the intermediary is in a state of default, then χt > 0 and the recovery
rate is determined endogenously as the value of the assets in the defaulted intermediary’s
balance sheet.
The household chooses a plan for state contingent consumption and asset holdings to
maximize its expected utility over the infinite time horizon, or
maxE
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtUt
]
11Clearly, it is necessary to assume that the central bank is credible when announcing its policy and can
then enforce it with the household. This assumption is not crucial for any of the paper results. The model
can be adjusted to account for imperfect enforcement, but it would be an additional mechanism that masks
some of the economic forces.
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Subject to the morning liquidity constraint (1.1) and the evening budget constraint (2.2),
where 0 < β < 1 represents the discount factor. Define ηt as the Lagrange multiplier for the
liquidity constraint (1.1) and λt as the multiplier for the budget constraint (2.2) at the time
period t. Taking the first-order conditions gives
w.r.t. camt :
βt
camt
= λt + ηt
w.r.t. cpmt : β
t = λt
w.r.t. bst : λt ≥ E {[θ (1− It+1) ηt+1 + (1− χt+1)λt+1] (1 + rst )}
w.r.t. bct : λt ≥ E {[θηt+1 + λt+1] (1 + rct )}
w.r.t. nct : λt ≥ E
{
λt+1
(
1 + rnt+1
)}
w.r.t. Mt : ϕtλt ≥ E {ϕt+1 (ηt+1 + λt+1)}
where all inequalities hold with equality if the choice variable is strictly positive. Divide
both sides by the value of λt to get the Euler equations
nct : 1 ≥ E
{
β
(
1 + rnt+1
)}
(1.4)
Mt : 1 ≥ E
{
ϕt+1
ϕt
(
ηt+1
βt
+ β
)}
(1.5)
bct : 1 ≥ E
{[
θ
ηt+1
βt
+ β
]
(1 + rct )
}
(1.6)
bst : 1 ≥ E
{[
θ (1− It+1) ηt+1
βt
+ (1− χt+1) β
]
(1 + rst )
}
(1.7)
These equations illustrate the structure of the returns in the economy. Equity return is
pinned down by a simple stochastic discount factor, as in traditional asset price models.
Then currency and securities have a liquidity premium component that is governed by the
Lagrange multiplier ηt on the morning liquidity constraint. Of course, the liquidity premium
is larger for currency, which is the most liquid asset in the economy. Securities follow, with
risky securities always having a smaller liquidity premium than safe ones, as implied by the
presence of the indicator function. Furthermore, risky securities returns are also subject to
a default premium, measured by the default loss rate χt+1.
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From the first order conditions of the problem, one can also derive the following relation-
ship
camt =
βt
λt + ηt
=
βt
βt + ηt
, (1.8)
which means that morning consumption camt is decreasing in the Lagrange multiplier ηt ≥ 0.
Therefore the maximum level of morning consumption is camt = 1 and it can be achieved
if and only if ηt = 0 (i.e. the morning liquidity constraint is not binding). If so, marginal
utilities of consumption are equalized between morning and evening.
The intuition behind this result is simple, since it would be a standard outcome in a
utility maximization problem with two goods subject to a budget constraint. Therefore the
household would always like to increase its holdings of assets that can relax the morning
constraint, even though it results in higher demanded returns for those assets. Whether or
not the supply of liquid assets is positive in equilibrium is an outcome of the interaction
between monetary policy and intermediaries.
1.2.2 Intermediaries’ Problem
Financial intermediaries’ main role is to manage capital and to provide liquidity in the
economy. That is, they take an asset as capital that households cannot manage directly and
transform it into a different asset that relaxes household’s morning liquidity constraint. Thus,
in the context of this paper, liquidity coincides with facilitating transactions, rather than the
classic definition of liquidity as the ability to quickly transform an asset into currency with
little to no losses on its face value. Examples of assets with such properties include demand
deposits, certificates of deposit, and commercial paper.
How risky is a security is determined by the operational choices of an intermediary, given
that they can commit to a contract, but they have limited liability. If an intermediary
operates as a commercial banker, then the balance sheet needs to be structured so that
issued securities that never default. I assume this is achieved by issuing equity, an asset that
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only has a residual claim to the intermediary’s profits. If instead the intermediary chooses
to operate as as shadow banks, whose liabilities default in the bad state, then he has no need
to raise equity to back security returns.
Intermediaries live only for two periods, as in an overlapping generations model. At a
given time period t there is a measure one of competitive intermediaries that issue securities
and raise equity (if needed) to invest in capital. At time t+ 1, the intermediary observes the
return on capital, repays its creditors and liquidates its equity with dividends, if any.
More formally, a newborn intermediary has a choice between two contracts. If the inter-
mediary chooses to operate as a commercial bank, it will have to raise debt and some equity
in order to make its securities default free. Furthermore, a commercial banker is subject
to some balance sheet costs τ proportional to the size of its assets, to be paid in units of
consumption good. The balance sheet costs reflect the regulatory cost of the banking ac-
tivity. In the United States, the the major source of regulatory costs for institutions that
offer demand deposits and other safe instruments is the FDIC insurance.12 If instead the
intermediary chooses to operate as a shadow banker, he is not going to be subject to as
much regulation and can issue risky securities that default in the bad state of the world.
Thus, a shadow banker not subject to the balance sheet costs and does not need to raise
equity. In both cases debt is implicitly collateralized by capital, and the modeling choice
can be thought as a simplified version of the collateral equilibrium framework described in
Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), Geanakoplos (2003), and Geanakoplos and Zame (2014).
In this environment, an intermediary that chooses to operate as a commercial bank is
subject to the balance sheet constraint
(1 + τ) qktK
c
t = b
c
t + n
c
t , (1.9)
where τ represents the balance sheet costs. The price of capital qkt is an “ex-dividend”
price, since the capital production for the current period is enjoyed by the older generation
12See Afonso, Armenter, and Lester (2018) and Banegas and Tase (2017).
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of intermediaries. Securities bct offer a real return 1 + r
c
t promised at the time of issuance,
therefore before the new aggregate shock At+1 realizes. The return on capital 1 + r
k
t+1
and the one on equity 1 + rnt+1 are instead stochastic and depend on the state realization.
Consequently, the expected profits of a newborn commercial banker are given by
E
[
Πct+1
]
= E
[
1 + rkt+1
]
qktK
c
t − (1 + rct ) bct − E
[
1 + rnt+1
]
nct , (1.10)
where the expected return on capital and the expected return on equity are to be determined
in equilibrium. The return on securities 1 + rct is not in an expectation term, since the
promised return on securities must always be delivered in full in order to create a safe
security. Then, it must be the case that the limited liability constraint is never binding for
the commercial banker. That is, the return on capital in the event of a bad shock is sufficient
to repay the promised return on securities, or
(
1 + rk`
)
qktK
c
t ≥ (1 + rct ) bct , (1.11)
where 1 + rk` = (A`+q
k
t+1)/qkt is the return on capital after drawing the low aggregate produc-
tivity state in period t + 1. The problem of the commercial banker is to choose capital Kc,
securities bc, and equity nc in order to maximize equation (2.5) subject to the balance sheet
constraint (2.4) and the liability constraint (2.6), taking as given prices and returns.
The balance sheet constraint for a shadow banker at time t is given by
qktK
s
t = b
s
t , (1.12)
and its expected profits in the following period are
E
[
Πst+1
]
= E
[
1 + rkt+1
]
qktK
s
t − E [(1− χt+1) (1 + rst )] bst , (1.13)
where 1+rst is the promised return on the shadow bank securities and 0 < 1−χt+1 < 1 is the
recovery rate on the promised return. By design of the contract, the shadow bank securities
never default in the good state of the world. Thus χh = 0 if the economy is in the good
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state. However, when a negative one is drawn, the shadow banker will partially default of
its liabilities and the recovery rate 1− χ` is pinned down by the limited liability constraint(
1 + rkl
)
qktK
s
t = (1− χ`) (1 + rst ) bst . (1.14)
The objective of a shadow banker is to choose securities bs and capital Ks in order to
maximize its profits (2.8), given the balance sheet (2.7), taking as given the recovery rate
pinned down by (2.9), prices and returns.
To wrap up the problem of a newborn intermediary, the decision between commercial
and shadow banking operation is taken according to the contract that returns the highest
expected profits, or
E [Πt+1] = max
{
E
[
Πct+1
]
, E
[
Πst+1
]}
.
1.2.3 Market Clearing and Equilibrium Definition
To close the model, the central bank sets a constant monetary policy described by
Mt+1 = (1 + µ)Mt, (1.15)
where µ is positive when the central bank is expanding the quantity of nominal currency in
circulation and negative when reducing it. As this is fiat currency, thus unbacked by any
asset, the central bank can potentially implement any policy it wants, as long as the implied
returns of money do not violate the household transversality conditions. Since the objective
of this paper is to study ex-ante prudential regulation, I will simply take central bank policy
as a given and solve for the resulting equilibrium.
Now that the description of all the economic actors is complete, I can define an equilibrium
in this economy
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a set of
• Sequences of state contingent prices ϕt, qkt and returns rst , rct , rnt
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• Default rates χt+1
• Household’s choices of Mt, bst , bct , nct , camt , cpmt
• Intermediaries’ choices of Kct , bct , nct , Kst , bst
Such that:
• Households maximize their utility, given prices, returns and default rates
• Intermediaries maximizes profits, given prices, returns and default rates
• The free entry condition holds
• The government budget is satisfied
Tt = µMt−1 + τqktK
c
t
• Markets clear, including
K¯ = Kct +K
s
t
Yt = c
am
t + c
pm
t = AtK¯
While this definition allows for a variety of equilibrium paths, I will focus on stationary
equilibria, where prices (except for the price of money ϕt), returns and quantities (except
for fiat currency) are constant over time. Since the quantity and price of currency are not
constant, in a stationary equilibrium only the real value of money mt = ϕtMt is constant
over time.
1.3 Main Economic Forces
In this section I am going to consider simplified versions of the model to illustrate the
basic economic forces at work and derive some basic results that will be helpful to study the
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complete model. First, I am going to look at the case where only a commercial bank operates.
Second, at the case where only a shadow bank operates. As I show in the following section,
both cases are actual corner solutions of the general model, so the following discussion is
also useful to fully characterize the results.
The purpose is to highlight the degree of complementarity and substitutability between
currency and securities, and what are the consequences on consumption outcomes. This also
sheds some light on the debate on the role of privately issued forms of money. That is, what
are the advantages and the limitations of a free banking system. While this has been the
object of economic research since the inception of the discipline,13 the modern debate around
the topic can be summarized into two positions. One one hand there is Hayek (1976), who
argued that we should have competition among different types of money within a country
until the best one prevailed. On the other, Friedman (1960) argues that liquidity provision
should be tightly controlled by the government.
Before moving to the specific cases of the model, it is useful to derive some general results
that apply regardless of the simplifications that I am going to make in the following sections.
First consider any monetary policy that satisfies constant growth of nominal currency from
(2.10), where I am going to refer to µ ≥ β−1 as the growth rate of money. The lower bound
for it is pinned down by the Friedman rule, where the nominal interest rates hit zero. In
order to achieve a stationary equilibrium, where the real value of money is constant, it must
be the case that the price of currency ϕt is moving in equal and opposite direction, or
ϕt+1
ϕt
=
1
1 + µ
. (1.16)
Note that this growth rate is exactly the inverse of the inflation rate, thus in this model
issuance of currency generates an equal amount of inflation.
Having established a path for money prices, I can revisit the money holding Euler equation
(1.7). Assuming that the household wants to hold a strictly positive quantity of currency,
13See Smith (1776) or Bagehot (1873).
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the equation simplifies to
1 + µ = E
[
ηt+1
βt
+ β
]
.
Using a guess and verify approach, one can prove that in a stationary equilibrium the liquidity
multiplier can be written as ηt+1 = β
tκt+1. κt ≥ 0 is a state contingent variable that
captures the potentially different morning consumption possibilities. Thus equation (1.7)
further simplifies to
κ¯ = E [κ] = 1 + µ− β, (1.17)
where I will refer to κ¯ as the expected or average liquidity premium in the economy.14 As
I am going to show in the next sections, this is one the essential quantities that determines
the welfare outcomes in the economy. In fact, morning consumption from equation (1.8) can
be written as a function of the realized liquidity premium κt:
camt =
β
β + κt
. (1.18)
1.3.1 A Model with Only Commercial Banks
Consider the model where the only choice for an intermediary is to offer a safe security,
thus operate as a commercial banker. To further simplify the analysis, also assume that the
commercial banker does not sustain any balance sheet costs (τ = 0). Using equation (1.5)
from the household problem, in a stationary equilibrium the commercial bank security needs
to offer a return equal to
1 + rc =
1
θκ¯+ β
. (1.19)
Given that equity has an expected return E [1 + rn] = 1/β, the term θκ¯ is a measure for the
liquidity premium of securities. In this context, it is even more transparent how the param-
eter θ can be interpreted as the relative liquidity value between currency and commercial
bank securities, since the implied return of currency is 1/(κ¯+β).
14This result is in line with Gu et al. (2016), who show that the overall amount of liquidity is constant.
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Having solved for the returns of assets, I can now look at the profit maximization problem
of a commercial banker. Because the expected profits of a commercial bankers are linear
in the asset allocation and that the return on securities is lower than the expected return
of equity, the banker would issue only securities if he had no further constraints. However,
the commercial banking contract requires him to provide safe securities that never defaults,
as implied by constraint (2.6). Thus, the constraint must be binding and I can solve for
securities expressed as a fraction of the total assets
bc
qkK¯
=
1 + rk`
1 + rc
, (1.20)
where I replace Kc = K¯ to account for the market clearing conditions. Another way to
interpret this equation is as the debt fraction of a banker’s liabilities, with the remaining
fraction being equity. Along the equilibrium path this fraction needs to be less than one,
which implies that in any equilibrium where a commercial bank is present there is no way
to offer a safe security without raising some equity.
Because of free entry, expected profits need to be zero in equilibrium, thus
E
[
1 + rk
]
qkK¯ = (1 + rc) bc + E [1 + rn]nc.
Divide this equation by the total value of capital qkK to write the expected return on capital
as a weighted average between the safe return on securities and the expected return on equity
E
[
1 + rk
]
= (1 + rc)
bc
qkK¯
+ E [1 + rn]
(
1− b
c
qkK¯
)
, (1.21)
where the portfolio weights are given by the composition of the balance sheet liabilities.
This is a relevant feature of the model, as the return on capital is only pinned down by the
demand coming from the financial sector of the economy. In an economy without banks in
which the households can hold capital but cannot do liquidity transformation, the expected
return on capital would be equal to the expected return of equity in the model. Thus, in
the presence of liquidity premium, the return on capital must be below the return implied
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by the household’s discount factor. That implies that there is some charter value in the
banking activity that would be destroyed without the financial system. General equilibrium
forces connect this charter value directly to the demand for liquidity from the representative
household.
Therefore, when only a commercial bank operates, the expected return on capital is
E
[
1 + rk
]
=
1
β
− 1− β
β
A¯− θ(A¯− A`)κ¯
A¯β + A`θκ¯
. (1.22)
First note how the expected liquidity premium κ¯ appears in this formula. With no liquidity
premium, the formula collapses to the standard return 1/β. Otherwise, capital returns are a
decreasing function of the average liquidity premium. Indeed this is what the general equi-
librium forces would suggest, as the increased but unsatisfied demand for securities depresses
their returns and in turn reduces the return for capital. Second, the low state productivity
Al appears explicitly in the formula, and not only as part of the average productivity of
capital A¯. This is because the limited liability constraint pins down the the structure of the
balance sheets, thus the weights in equation (1.21).
The return on capital also gives a solution for the price of capital, that can be used to
solve for the real amount of securities and equity issued by the commercial bank. More
importantly, these securities never default, so the liquidity conditions for the household
must be the same regardless of the state. In other words there is no variance in the liquidity
premium term, so κ¯ = κl = κh = 1 +µ−β. Therefore, equation (1.18) implies that morning
consumption is equalized between the two states and expected one period utility in the
stationary equilibrium is
E [U ] = log
(
β
β + κ¯
)
+ A¯K¯ − β
β + κ¯
, (1.23)
where the linear term is expected evening consumption. This illustrates how the liquidity
premium in the economy is the determinant factor for welfare. Furthermore, it also highlights
how monetary policy has welfare implications, since the expected utility is decreasing in the
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inflation rate µ.
The non neutrality of money in this environment arises mechanically from the presence
of the liquidity constraint that governs morning consumption. However, it still highlights the
role of an inflation tax in the economy. Namely, higher levels of inflation in this model push
consumption into the future (i.e. the evening), as the return of holding currency becomes
smaller and the representative household does not want to hold as much of it.
A second consequence is that the highest expected utility is achieved when the growth
rate of currency µ is the smallest, at µ = β − 1. This is not a surprising result, since it is
standard in monetary models. As the nominal interest rate hits zero, the return of currency
is equalized to the expected return of a Lucas tree, thus the rate of return dominance
disappears. Then also the wedge from the morning liquidity constraint must disappear,
otherwise the household would demand more money to satisfy its liquidity needs. If the
morning constraint is no longer binding, then the morning and evening marginal utilities are
equalized, which is the general condition for optimality.
After discussing the banker and the household problem, I can close the model by looking
at the real value of money m. All of the previous discussion assumed that the household is
willing to hold a strictly positive amount of real currency. However, it is possible that the
supply of liquidity from a commercial bank is so large that money is worthless.15 Using the
optimal level of consumption in equation (1.18) and the morning liquidity constraint (1.1),
it is possible to solve for the real value of money and derive the following result:
Proposition 1. Given a monetary policy µ and parameters of the model, there exist a
threshold for the security liquidity θ¯c such that
• If θ ≥ θ¯c, no monetary equilibrium exists
15A non monetary equilibrium always coexists with the monetary equilibrium I am describing, as it is the
case for models with fiat currency.
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• If θ < θ¯c there is a monetary equilibrium and the value of money is decreasing in θ
For the proof and the closed form solution for the real value of money m see appendix 1.A.1.
Intuitively, if securities can provide abundant liquidity services, then there is no need for
fiat currency. Under the interpretation suggested in Hayek (1976), this is as if commercial
banks’ securities emerged as the dominant currency after competition. If instead securities
provide little liquidity services, then the household demands more aggregate liquidity than
what the commercial bank can supply. Thus, fiat currency and securities must coexist.
1.3.2 A Model with Only Shadow Banks
Now consider an environment where only shadow bankers operate. That is, the only assets
that can relax the household morning liquidity constraint are fiat currency and securities that
default when the bad state of the world is drawn. Unlike the previous case, consumption
cannot be equalized between the two states, as one asset loses its liquidity value in the
event of a negative shock. Then holding currency becomes an insurance instruments against
negative shocks. However, the expected return of currency is still limited by equation (1.17),
so the insurance value of currency is constrained by the expected return that currency needs
to have in a monetary equilibrium.
As in the previous section, the return of money is dominated by the return on shadow
bank securities. However, the sources of dominance are different. From equation (1.4), the
promised return on shadow bank securities is
1 + rs =
1
θ (1− pi)κh + (1− piχ`) β . (1.24)
In the high state, shadow bank securities do not default, thus they enjoy a liquidity premium
as measured by (1− pi)κh and no risk premium component. On the other hand, in the low
state these securities lose their liquidity value and gain a default premium component −piχ`β
that measures the amount of return lost in the event of a bankruptcy. So the shadow banker
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is only able to capture a fraction of the liquidity premium and needs to pay an additional
amount to compensate for the risk of default. Since the value lost in the bankruptcy χ` is
determined in equilibrium, the overall return of the risky security may exceed the discount
rate.
The return on securities then directly pins down the return on capital. As implied in
equation (2.7), securities are the only source of financing for the shadow bank, and the free
entry condition still implies zero expected profits. Then combining (2.7), (2.8), (1.24), and
the zero profit condition solves for the expected return of capital
E
[
1 + rk
]
=
1− piχ`
θ (1− pi)κh + (1− piχ`) β , (1.25)
where the numerator is the result of the expansion of the expected value of the recovery rate
1 − χ. Note how if the liquidity needs of a household are completely satisfied in the high
state (κh = 0), then the expected return to pay out for a banker is exactly equal to 1/β, the
return of an asset when there are no liquidity concerns and the expected return a consumer
demands on equity.
While equation (1.24) pins down the promised return to the household, the shadow bank
is only paying it in full in the high state. In the low state only a fraction 1 − χ` of the
promised return is paid out as pinned down by combining (2.7) with (2.9) to get
1 + rk` =
1− χ`
θ (1− pi)κh + (1− piχ`) β . (1.26)
This equation, together with (1.25), summarizes the interaction of the different general
equilibrium forces in the financial assets market. Taking the price of capital as given, the
liquidity premium in the high state κh and the default loss rate χ` adjust to jointly guarantee
that no more securities are issued and that the limited liability constraint is binding. If
equation (1.25) fails, then the supply of securities, thus the overall supply of liquidity, must
change to bring profits to zero. If (1.26) fails, then default loss rate χ` adjusts so that no
value is destroyed in the bankruptcy process.
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Unlike the model with commercial bankers only, in any equilibrium it must be that the
household is more liquidity constrained in the bad state, or κ` > κh. This is a consequence
of having securities that default, and therefore the aggregate amount of liquidity changes
between the states. Another difference is that money fully derives its value from the morning
consumption a household can afford in the low state. Thus, the real value of money is tied
to the liquidity premium in the low state κ`. Of course, it may still be the case that the
corresponding issuance of securities is too high to result in an average liquidity premium of
κ¯ = 1+µ−β. I defer the details on how to solve for the high state liquidity premium κh and
the low state loss rate after default χ` to appendix 1.A.2. Also, since the liquidity premium
κ is a factor of the Lagrange multiplier η, it must also be the case that κ ≥ 0 in all states.
Studying these conditions leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Given a monetary policy µ and parameters of the model, there exist a
threshold for the security liquidity θ¯s such that
• If θ > θ¯s, no monetary equilibrium exists
• if θ = θ¯s there is a monetary equilibrium with κh = 0 and κ` = (1+µ−β)/pi
• If θ < θ¯s there is a monetary equilibrium with κ` > κh > 0
This result is similar to the one derived under commercial banking, since when securities
have very high liquidity value θ they can fully replace currency. However, the real value of
money is no longer necessarily decreasing in security liquidity. When θ is small enough, the
value of money is increasing in security liquidity. At those initial levels for θ, the liquidity
value of securities is so small that the insurance motive for holding money dominates, driving
up demand and therefore its price. Low security liquidity also makes them more expensive
to issue, as the shadow banker can only capture a small fraction of the liquidity premium.
This reduces the supply of securities and drives the household towards currency.
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A second difference concerns morning consumption and welfare. In a monetary equilib-
rium, welfare depends on the amount of liquidity a shadow bank can issue, as parametrized
by θ. Moreover, welfare can either increase or decrease as the amount of shadow bank se-
curities, as measured by θ, increases. Starting from the case where θ = θ¯s, the liquidity
needs of the household are fully satisfied in the high state, since κh = 0. Thus also morning
consumption is maximized in the same state. The downside of higher morning consumption
in the good state is variance in consumption, as the liquidity premium in the low state is the
highest possible in any equilibrium. Therefore morning consumption is minimized in the low
state. Now look at the case where θ < θ¯s. While morning consumption in the low state is
still smaller than the one in the high state, the difference between the two is smaller. While
reducing the variance in marginal utilities is always welfare improving, level effects may pre-
vail. I will discuss equilibrium ranking, thus whether the supply of liquidity is efficient or
not, in the following section after studying the the outcomes in the more general version of
the model.
1.4 General Case Results
In the previous section I have established the role of each type of security in providing liquid-
ity services. Safe securities and fiat currency are close to perfect substitutes, therefore there
is a role for both only if the general equilibrium forces constrain the commercial banker to a
limited issuance. On the other hand, risky securities provide the household with additional
consumption only in one state of the world, thus complementing fiat currency but never
being a substitute for it.
In light of these facts, I will now consider the case where all securities can be issued.
That is, where an intermediary has the choice of operating either as a commercial banker
or as a shadow banker. The economy that emerges has a positive supply of all of the assets
types, with consumption outcomes similar to the ones observed in Proposition 2. However,
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a different structure may emerge, with only one type of banker as described previously. In
fact, under some parametrizations, there may even be multiple equilibria. This is going to
lead me to the following section, where I will discuss the welfare implications of the model.
1.4.1 No Balance Sheet Costs (τ = 0)
First consider the case where there are no additional balance sheet costs on the commercial
bank operations. The main reason to look at this special case is to evaluate the equilibrium
that emerges purely from the different funding structure of each intermediary. The shadow
banker issues an asset that usually demands a lower return than equity. However, safe
securities ask for an even lower return, so running a commercial bank may be the more
profitable option for a given return on capital.
These forces combine with the linearity of the intermediary’s problem to generate a set
of indifference conditions that need to hold in order to achieve an equilibrium where both
safe and risky securities circulate and complement currency. First, the commercial and the
shadow banker must make the same profits, or one way of operating in the financial markets
would dominate the other. Second, free entry implies that the expected return of capital
is equal to the expected payout for risky securities and to the average cost of issuing safe
securities and equity of Equation (1.21). Third, the total amount of securities (i.e. both safe
and risky) issued must be small enough to require a positive value for fiat currency, in which
case the average liquidity premium in the economy is pinned down by Equation (1.17).
These three conditions also provide the framework to solve for a equilibrium. The general
solution method follows a guess and verify approach, where I postulate the structure of the
liquidity premia and which intermediaries operate in the stationary equilibrium. I illustrate
this procedure in the following example, where I show how it can also be used to rule out
candidate equilibria. Suppose there exists an equilibrium where safe and risky securities
are issued and the liquidity premium in the high state is zero (κh = 0). Monetary policy
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is away from the Friedman rule (µ > β − 1). Equation (1.25) needs to hold, as the shadow
banker must make zero profits. Since κh = 0, Equation (1.25) implies that the expected
cost of issuing risky securities for the shadow banker is equal to the discount rate. Thus,
the shadow bank zero profit condition requires the expected return on capital to be equal to
the discount rate as well. From (1.4), the return on equity is also equal to the discount rate.
Nevertheless, there is still a positive liquidity premium that the commercial banker is able
to capture from the low state, thus the return on commercial bank securities is lower than
the return on equity. Consequently, the portfolio weighted cost of funding for a commercial
bank is always lower than the expected return on capital, which means that the commercial
bank’s expected profits are strictly positive. As a result, the shadow banker should operate
as a commercial one, which is a violation of the equilibrium conditions.
The previous example rules out any equilibrium where the liquidity demand from the
household is fully satisfied in one state by any combination of liquid securities. Thus, in
equilibrium the household morning constraint (1.1) is always binding and the associated
liquidity premium must be strictly positive. More generally, it is possible to construct the
following equilibria involving a commercial bank:
Proposition 3. If an equilibrium with positive issuance of safe securities exists, then it takes
one of the following forms
• If θ < θ¯c and pi ≥ p¯i, then only safe securities are issued with κ` = κh = 1 + µ− β
• If θcs < θ < θ¯cs and pi < p¯i, then both safe and risky securities operate with κ` > κh > 0
The details of the derivation can be found in the appendix 1.A.3. Importantly, the threshold
for the probability of a low state pi is the same for the two possible equilibria, so the two
equilibria are mutually exclusive. However, the liquidity threshold is different, since, when
the both bankers operate, the increased availability of privately issued liquid instruments
reduces changes the role for currency.
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The first equilibrium is the same as the one described in section 3.1. However, now that
the intermediary has a choice about on whether to issue safe or risky liabilities, I need to
verify that a shadow banker does not find it optimal to enter and issue risky bonds. That is,
issuing risky bonds must return negative expected profits. This will happen if the shadow
banker can capture enough of the existing liquidity premium, so that the expected return
paid on risky securities goes below the average cost of funding for a commercial bank. As
risky securities only have access to the liquidity premium in the high state, the less is the
high state likely, the less premium they can capture. A highly unlikely good state also
increases the risk premium, further increasing the cost of issuing a risky security. Therefore,
an equilibrium with a commercial bank exists only if the probability of a low state is large
enough.
If instead the probability of a low state is small, then the issuer of risky securities wants
to enter the market. The result is an equalization of the cost of funding, as long as one
type of banker is not incentivized to expand its balance sheet beyond feasibility. This is
the mechanism that drives the existence of the lower bound for the liquidity of securities
θcs. As the liquidity value of securities θ decreases, the shadow banking sector controls a
larger share of the capital in the economy. This is driven by an increase in the difference
between the expected return on capital and the realized return in the low state. This forces
the commercial bank to issue more equity to insure the return of its safe securities. The
increased operational cost reduces the size of commercial banking to the point that shadow
bankers would want to control more than the available capital. On the contrary, the role of
the upper bound θ¯cs is the same as the one seen in the previous sections, where if securities
bring too much liquidity value, then there is no place for money.
In terms of consumption, both type of securities circulate in the second equilibrium,
thus morning consumption is differentiated between the two states. As in the equilibrium
described in Proposition 2, the household is able to consume more in the high state mornings,
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but not as much as to completely fulfill its liquidity needs. However, the mechanism is
different from the one in Proposition 2. There fiat currency was fully responsible for the
consumption in the low state, so the value of currency was more sensitive to the changes in the
values of parameters like the liquidity value of securities θ. In this case, the value of currency
is less elastic to such changes, since part of the change is absorbed by the commercial bank’s
securities. In other words, the real value of money is more stable with respect to changes in
the environment when other similarly safe sources of liquidity are available.
Finally, let me discuss the possibility of an equilibrium where only the shadow banker
operates. This amounts to verifying whether a commercial bank would have any incentive
to enter in the equilibrium describe in Proposition 2. The commercial bank does not have
an incentive to enter in extreme regions of the parameter space. One way to have negative
profits for a commercial bank entrant is to use an unrealistically low discount factor. If at
the same time the probability of a low state is small, then a potential commercial bank would
fund almost the entirety of its assets with securities, achieving an average cost of funding
below the one of a shadow banker. For more reasonable values of the discount factor, an
equilibrium with only risky securities requires a close to zero probability of a bad state and
high levels of inflation, with growth rate of money µ in excess of 50% per period.
When such an equilibrium exists, a commercial bank only equilibrium might also exist
under the same parametrization. In other words, this model allows for multiple equilibria
within the class of stationary monetary equilibria. This is driven by the linearity of the
problem, that pushes intermediaries to corner solutions (i.e. either zero or infinite supply of
liquid assets) outside the zero profit conditions that characterize an equilibrium.
1.4.2 Positive Balance Sheet Costs (τ > 0)
The previous sections serves as a baseline to understand the interaction between different
types of liquid debt securities. However, the issuance of different types of securities is often
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connected to management and regulatory costs that go beyond the simple difference in
returns. For instance, a financial intermediary may implement stronger monitoring practices
when investing in capital backed by high grade debt (as in Benigno and Robatto (2018)). In
terms of regulatory costs, the biggest one for bank holding companies is the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance fee (see Afonso et al. (2018) and Banegas and Tase
(2017)).
To model these differences in the cost of funding, I assume that the commercial banker
needs to pay an additional cost measured as a fraction τ > 0 of the capital he acquires.
This is effectively a capital tax, that is payed in units of the consumption good and then
rebated as a lump sum to the household.16 All things equal, the additional cost increases the
return on capital required for a commercial bank to break even, thus it creates the space for
new types of equilibria that were impossible in the previous case. Furthermore, it opens the
possibility for multiple equilibria over the same parameter space. As different equilibria have
different welfare implications, government policies also have the role of addressing selection
among the multiple equilibria.
First, I am going to describe the main equilibrium that emerges under this market struc-
ture. Suppose that in equilibrium both securities are issued and that shadow bankers expand
their balance sheet up to the point where the liquidity premium in the high state drops to
zero. Since the commercial banker is subject to an additional cost, its profits do not be-
come strictly positive, as it was the case in section 4.1. Then, because the average liquidity
premium is constant in any equilibrium, a decrease in the liquidity premium in the high
state requires an increase of the liquidity premium in the low state. The conditions for the
equilibrium to exist are detailed in the following proposition, which I prove in appendix
1.A.4.
16The results would not be different if the capital tax was simply destroyed, but the assumption of a
lump-sum rebate makes facilitates the welfare analysis.
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Proposition 4. Given a monetary policy µ > β − 1 and parameters of the model, if τ <
τ¯ scand θ ≥ θscτ , or τ ≥ τ¯ sc and θscτ ≤ θ ≤ θ¯scτ , then there exists an equilibrium where both
bankers operate and the liquidity premia are given by
κh = 0 and κ` =
1 + µ− β
pi
.
The intuition for the boundary is the same as Proposition 3. If the liquidity of securities
is low, then the shadow banker has an incentive to expand its balance sheet beyond what is
feasible in the economy. The same holds true if the balance sheet costs τ are large. If that is
the case, then the financial sector as a whole may also issue too many securities, rendering
money useless. Thus an upper bound for security liquidity exists in this parameter region.
A second possible equilibrium involves shadow banks only. As detailed in section 1.3.2,
this equilibrium is characterized by the circulation of risky securities only, thus currency
is necessary to achieve positive morning consumption in the low state. Furthermore, the
equilibrium liquidity will generally not lead to the zero liquidity premium in the high state
of Proposition 4. The existence of this equilibrium is limited by the commercial banker’s
incentives to entry. As expected, the positive balance sheet cost strongly reduces the expected
profits of the commercial banker, making the equilibrium feasible in a more realistic part of
the parameter space.
Finally, the equilibria with commercial banks only or with both bankers but positive
liquidity premium in both states detailed in Proposition 3 are also possible with positive
balance sheet costs. They are still mutually exclusive, but they can each exist in regions
where the equilibrium of Proposition 4 exists.17 This is where the multiplicity of equilibria
for this model comes into play. The linearity of the problem makes it so that the financial
sector can divide the ownership of capital, and the consequent issuance of liquid securities,
in different ways that are all compatible with the equilibrium definition. Which one is picked
17See appendix 1.B.1 for a numerical illustration.
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can be the outcome of a sunspot, or the result of government policies that constrain asset
issuance. This is the goal of the final section of this paper, after I show some numerical
examples of the above equilibria and discuss the welfare effects of the liquidity premium
distribution.
1.4.3 Numerical Example
Before discussing welfare in detail, let me compute some some numerical examples to illus-
trate the different equilibria that can emerge, as detailed in the previous section. I will show
how the capital is allocated across the financial sector, and, if the equilibrium is inefficient,
what the best morning consumption allocation would look like.
Consider the set of parameters in table 2 for my first example, with the time interval
representing one quarter. I choose the balance sheet cost τ to match the cost of the FDIC
insurance in the United States. Banegas and Tase (2017) estimate this cost at 7 basis points
over the entire assets composition of the average balance sheet of an insured intermediary.
Then I pick the productivity in the low state A` such that consumption must be positive
in both sub-periods in any equilibrium. I then impose the high state productivity Ah to be
approximately 10% larger than the low state one. I pick a standard discount factor and set
the growth rate of currency to the Federal Reserve inflation target. The probability of a low
state is chosen so that the unconditional probability of a recession over the following three
years is approximately 38%. Finally, I choose a liquidity parameter for the bank securities
θ to match two facts. First, households hold financial assets equal to approximately 5 times
their quarterly disposable income 18 . Second, the bank issued liabilities of the model capture
the entire set of non-equity securities issued by financial intermediaries. Some of these do
18According to the Financial Accounts of the United States, in the second quarter of 2018 household’s
total assets were 793.63% of the disposable income, with purely financial assets being 568.11% of disposable
income. These values are well above the respective long run median and close or above the record levels
reached in 2007 before the housing price collapse.
32
Parameter Value Source
A` 1.0007 Model condition
Ah 1.1 ∼ 10% difference between states
K¯ 1 Normalization
τ 0.0007 Banegas and Tase (2017)
β 0.95 Standard
µ 0.02 Fed Inflation Target
pi 0.04 Conservative Recession Likelihood
θ 0.555 U.S. Financial Accounts
Table 1.2: Numerical Example Parameter Values
not provide liquidity service and therefore should not enter the household’s morning liquidity
constraint.
Under this parametrization, the competitive equilibrium is the one detailed in Proposition
4, with morning consumption maximized in the high state. Approximately 95% of capital
is held by the commercial banking sector, with the remaining part in the shadow banking
sector. While the shadow banking sector is roughly ten times smaller than the commercial
banking sector, its default causes the morning consumption in the low state to be about two
fifths of the good state one. Of course, the total of morning and evening consumption in
the low state only falls by 10%, which is equal to the drop in production. The impact on
morning consumption is so large because the shadow bankers issue approximately 75% of the
aggregate amount of privately issued liquid securities. When weighted by the liquidity value
θ, the shadow bankers issue 60% of the aggregate liquidity, which is exactly the amount
morning consumption drops in the low state. Finally, the real value for money implies a
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Variable Description Equilibrium Value
Kc Commercial Capital 95.33%
Ks Shadow Capital 4.67%
m Real Currency 0.1567
camh High State am Consumption 1
cam` Low State am Consumption 0.4086
Table 1.3: Numerical Example Equilibrium Outcomes
currency to average GDP ratio of about 15%. These steady state results are summarized in
table 3.
As I am going to show in the next section, this allocation of consumption is ex-ante
inefficient, since under this parametrization the planner would like to reorganize the liquidity
provision such that morning consumption is equalized between the two states. This means
that the highest level of utility is reached when
camh = c
am
` = 0.9314 (1.27)
That is, morning consumption is about 7% lower in the high state, but it becomes approxi-
mately 2.6 times lower in the low state.
To further highlight this point, consider a parametrization where multiple equilibria are
possible. By lowering the liquidity value of securities to θ = 0.035, two monetary equilibria
exists. In the first one, labeled “Worse Equilibrium”, liquidity is organized as in Proposition
4 and consumption is maximized in the high state. In the second one, labeled “Better
Equilibrium” where both bankers operate, but morning consumption is not maximized in the
low state since shadow bankers are constrained. First, the composition of the financial sector
is dramatically different between the two states. In the better equilibrium, the commercial
banks have a much larger security offering, which means that shadow bankers have less
34
Variable Description Worse Equilibrium Better Equilibrium
Kc Commercial Capital 18% 64.22%
Ks Shadow Capital 82% 35.78%
m Real Currency 0.3206 0.1571
camh High State am Consumption 1 0.9474
cam` Low State am Consumption 0.3519 0.6627
Per Period Utility 1.6034 1.8337
Table 1.4: Multiple Equilibria with θ = 0.0035
liquidity premium that they can capture. This is a welfare improvement for the household,
as consumption is now more stable between the two states. However, none of the equilibria
achieves the welfare maximizing morning consumption in (1.27), hence the choice of labels.
Table 4 summarizes these results.
It is worth noting how the worse equilibrium returns the same amount of morning con-
sumption, and therefore welfare, as the equilibrium in the previous numerical example. This
further highlights the point that the only element that matters for welfare is the amount of
liquidity provided in each state, rather than how the financial sector is providing it (i.e. the
composition of currency, safe and risky securities). Given this observation, the next section
studies how a welfare maximizing planner would allocate liquidity across states.
1.5 Inefficient Supply of Liquidity
In the previous sections I have detailed the equilibrium structure of the financial sector and
what is the liquidity provision in each equilibrium. The numerical illustration showed how,
keeping all the parameters constant, reallocating liquidity between states can be welfare
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improving. Therefore I will now study the optimal provision of liquidity.
To do so, consider the household’s optimal morning consumption as written in Equation
(1.18). Since morning consumption depends on the state contingent liquidity premium κt
and the average liquidity premium in a monetary equilibrium is pinned down by (1.17), I
can write stationary equilibrium welfare as a function of the high state liquidity premium κh.
Furthermore, market clearing and the definition of transfers imply that evening consumption
is cpmt = AtK¯ − camt . Thus, the per period expected utility in a stationary equilibrium given
a monetary policy µ and high state liquidity premium κh is
W = (1− pi)
[
log
(
β
β + κh
)
+
(
AhK¯ − β
β + κh
)]
+ pi
[
log
(
β
β + 1+µ−β−(1−pi)κh
pi
)
+
(
A`K¯ − β
β + 1+µ−β−(1−pi)κh
pi
)]
, (1.28)
where κh ∈ [0, 1 + µ− β]. The bounds on the liquidity premium arise from the characteriza-
tion of the liquidity premia from the household’s problem and the structure of the financial
system, that also requires κ` ≥ κh.
First, let me discuss which monetary policy achieves the highest levels of welfare. In
other words, what would be the monetary policy chosen by a welfare maximizing central
bank. As shown in section 2.3.1, the highest level of welfare in a given state is achieved
only if the liquidity premium is zero. Thus, if there exists a monetary policy such that the
liquidity premium is zero in both states, that would immediately be a candidate for the first
best monetary policy. That policy is the Friedman rule, or setting the money growth rate to
µ = β − 1. Any other policy, with µ > β − 1, requires a positive average liquidity premium,
thus morning consumption must be less than optimal in at least one of the productivity
states.
While the Friedman rule is the best monetary policy in terms of welfare, it has a number
of drawbacks that might make it infeasible, both in this model and as a real world tool.
First, since µ < 0, it requires that the central bank has the power to tax the household.
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Second, the Friedman rule would endogenously create a system where private agents do not
engage in the transformation of liquidity. This is because no banker as defined in the model
would find it profitable to enter under the Friedman rule. To have a competitive equilibrium,
households must be able to hold capital directly or through a specialized manager who acts as
a pass-through entity. Under these assumption, the central bank becomes the only supplier
of liquidity.
The first best nature of the Friedman rule also implies that welfare is subject to an
inflation or liquidity cost that is necessary to sustain a monetary equilibrium. This cost can
be divided equally, thus keeping consumption constant across states, or concentrated in the
low state to increase morning consumption in the high state. The next section investigates
which allocation is preferred by the household.
1.5.1 Second Best and Inefficient Liquidity
Since the Friedman rule cannot be implemented in a competitive equilibrium, the central
bank is forced to choose a policy such that µ > β − 1. For a given choice of the money
growth rate, I define a second best supply of liquid assets which translates into the state
contingent liquidity premia. While the second best outcome may not be implementable in a
competitive equilibrium, it is informative of the outcomes that government policies should
aim for.
First, Equation (1.18), combined with Equation (1.17), implies that the expected marginal
utility with respect to morning consumption is constant in any equilibrium and equal to
E [U ′] =
1 + µ− β
β
=
κ¯
β
.
Therefore there are two channels that operate in selecting the welfare maximizing liquidity
premium. On one hand, having different liquidity premia in the two states increases the vari-
ance in the marginal utility realizations, which negatively impact welfare for a risk averse
household. On the other hand, having a positive liquidity premium moves consumption from
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the morning to the evening. Therefore, reducing the liquidity premium brings consumption
back to the morning (where the household values it the most) and increases the state con-
tingent utility level. The welfare maximization problem, shown in detail in appendix 1.A.5,
reflects these two forces and leads to the following result:
Proposition 5. If
√
(1+µ)(2β−µ−1)
β2
> 1 − 2pi , then κh = 1 + µ − β is the unique welfare
maximizer. If not, then welfare is maximized for some interior liquidity premium κh ∈
(0, 1 + µ− β].
The propositions states that if the growth rate of money is small enough, then the
best outcome is achieved by equalizing the liquidity premium, and therefore consumption,
across all states. That is exactly what one would expect from a risk averse consumer that
would always like to even out consumption over uncertain outcomes. However, as monetary
policy selects higher levels of inflation and the required average liquidity premium increases,
consumption does not decrease as much when you concentrate the cost of liquidity in one
state. Thus, it becomes beneficial to cluster the reduction in consumption in the unlikely
state and consume as much as possible in the good state.
The proposition also implies that setting the liquidity premium to zero in one state is
never welfare maximizing. Therefore:
Corollary 1. The competitive equilibrium in Proposition 4 is inefficient, in the sense that
there exists a different liquidity allocation that improves on household’s welfare.
The consequences of this result can be counter-intuitive. In fact, an economy that relies
only on risky securities may achieve higher levels of welfare than the one that mixes safe and
risky securities. This apparent puzzle is solved by noting that in an equilibrium with only
risky securities aggregate liquidity is less volatile, which is preferable when the growth rate
of money µ is small. As shown in the numerical example, the welfare gains from liquidity
reallocation can be sizable. Therefore, regulation that imposes further restrictions on the
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assets or liabilities on an intermediary’s balance sheet can be a powerful tool to address
inefficiencies.
The result can also be interpreted as an argument in favor of the Friedman (1960) position.
If we let the markets supply a variety of liquid securities, as suggested by Hayek (1976), the
competitive equilibrium involves an oversupply of liquid assets that dries out in a crisis
and leads to deeper recession. However, it may not be the case that tightly controlling
liquidity or imposing narrow banking is the optimal policy, especially when inflation is high
or households are impatient. If that is the case, the competitive equilibrium would still
be the one in Proposition 4, but the optimal policy involves only some restrictions on the
issuance of risky securities. That is, with high inflation Proposition 5 states that it is optimal
to have some variation in the levels of aggregate liquidity between states. Therefore, there
would still be scope for a financial sector that is involved in liquidity transformation.
1.6 Government Policies
Having determined that the competitive equilibrium in Proposition 4 is inefficient, I turn my
attention to institutional realistic interventions that have been proposed or implemented to
strengthen the financial system. I choose to focus on that competitive equilibrium since it
is the one that provides a better description of reality. There is abundant liquidity during
normal times, but during a crisis privately created liquidity dries up, but does not completely
disappear. Because the welfare analysis from the previous section is ex-ante, I will study
if and how macro-prudential policies can achieve the second best welfare of Proposition
5. In particular, I will focus on liquidity requirements and equity requirements. Liquidity
requirements reduce the volatility of assets and therefore reduce losses in the event of a
default.19 Similarly, equity requirements protect security holders by issuing a junior asset
19Of course, liquidity requirements may also be useful to prevent other causes of a financial collapse, such
as bank runs.
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that is the first to absorb the losses.
1.6.1 Liquidity Requirements
In this section I am going to focus on liquidity requirements as a policy to address the
inefficiencies in the financial markets. As currently implemented, the main objective of
liquidity requirements is to avoid self-fulfilling prophecies that would lead to a bank run.20
In fact, an intermediary can be solvent, with assets valued more than liabilities, but not able
to cover unexpected cash flows.
As such, the Basel III accords introduce a liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirement,
where intermediaries need to hold an amount of liquid assets greater or equal to their net cash
flow over a 30-day stress period.21 To implement this regulation in the model, I will consider
cash as the only asset that counts toward the liquidity requirement and require intermediaries
to hold a fraction of their liabilities in the liquid asset. Thus every intermediary will have
to hold an amount of fiat currency greater or equal than a fraction 0 < δ < 1 of the issued
securities, or
mc ≥ δcbc and ms ≥ δsbs.
This notation allows for potentially different regulation to be imposed on the two banking
sectors. It is clear that the constraint is always going to be binding for both banking
sectors, since in equilibrium the return on currency is always lower than the expected return
on capital. Thus, liquidity requirements can be interpreted as an additional cost that is
20As intended in the literature stemming from the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model.
21As in my model, different assets have different likelihood of losing their liquidity value and are conse-
quently classified differently. Level 1 assets are the safest and most liquid, thus they fully count towards the
liquidity requirements. Examples include cash, central bank reserves, and high quality government securi-
ties. Level 2 assets carry some risk of losing their liquidity value, thus only a fraction of their value counts
towards the liquidity coverage ratio, with haircuts up to 50%. Starting from the most liquid instruments,
examples include securities issued or guaranteed by specific multilateral development banks or sovereign
entities, securities issued by U.S. government-sponsored enterprises, publicly traded common stocks, and
investment-grade corporate debt securities issued by non-financial sector corporations.
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imposed on intermediaries with the objective objective of pushing the intermediaries to issue
more or only safe liabilities.
After the new regulation is imposed, I let the economy adjusts to a new stationary
competitive equilibrium. Then, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6. Suppose that the parameters are such that the second best welfare prescribes
κh = κ` = 1 + µ− β. If
δc < f (δs)
and δc ≥ δc, the welfare maximizing liquidity allocation can be achieved as a competitive
equilibrium where only the commercial banks operate.
Where f (·) is an increasing function. Shadow bankers do not find it profitable to enter
the market if δc < f (δs). The second condition, δc ≥ δc, is necessary to ensure that the
household is holding a positive amount of currency. However, it is always verified (i.e. δc < 0)
for realistic levels of inflation µ. For reasonable values of δc22 and low values of the inflation
rate, this proposition implies that liquidity regulation must be stricter on shadow banks, or
δs > δc.
There are two consequences for policy. First, differentiating the regulation between com-
mercial and shadow banks is necessary in order to achieve the efficient welfare allocation.
Secondly, achieving the efficient allocation requires a policy that imposes a stricter liquidity
constraint on the issuers of risky securities. It can be shown that, if the opposite is true, the
competitive equilibrium with regulation allocates liquidity as in the inefficient equilibrium of
Proposition 4. The intuition is the following: an equal liquidity requirement would increase
the marginal cost of funding by the same amount for both intermediaries. Thus, the shadow
22According to the Quarterly Trends for Consolidated U.S. Banking Organizations, in the 4th quarter of
2017 the banking industry was holding 1.36% of their assets in cash and 9.14% in reverse repo and Fed
Funds. Government bonds represent another 1.39% of the total assets. Thus having δc < 0.2 would achieve
a realistic value of overall liquid securities in the balance sheet.
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banker would still find it profitable to enter the market when it is not socially optimal. The
additional requirement on shadow banks is then necessary to make their expected profits
negative.
However, this approach presents strong limitations in practical applications. Since dif-
ferent liquidity requirements need to be imposed on the different financial firms, there may
be issues with the incentive compatibility of such plan. Any financial institution in the real
economy offers a mix of safe and risky securities and the regulator may not be able to dis-
tinguish the two without monitoring. Thus, any intermediary’s manager has an incentive to
increase profits by overstating the fraction of safe securities issued. A supervising authority
would need to be able carry detailed audits of every security issued by a given intermedi-
ary to identify any deviation from the imposed regulations. The cost of such activity may
outweigh the benefit of a more efficient allocation of liquidity.
1.6.2 Capital Requirements
After establishing that liquidity requirements can restore efficiency but may be difficult to
implement, I will turn my attention to capital requirements. These have been long used to
ensure the stability of the financial sector, and they have been subject to numerous revisions.
The underlying principle is to make sure financial institutions have enough skin in the game
to avoid excessive risk taking and also enough resources to withstand a negative shock.
Under the Basel III agreement, financial institutions must hold a minimum amount of
capital relative to their risk weighted assets.23 This type of regulation can be almost directly
implemented in the model, by mandating intermediaries to issue equity for at least a fraction
23Financial institutions must have a ratio of common equity tier 1 over risk weighted assets greater than
4.5%. That means, an intermediary must have an amount of common stocks and earnings greater than 4.5%
of the value of its assets, weighted by the risk. A broader requirement also mandates a Tier 1 capital (which
includes equity-like securities such as non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred stocks) ratio over the risk
weighted assets over 6%.
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0 < γ < 1 of their assets, or
nc ≥ γcqkKc and ns ≥ γsqkKs.
As in the previous section I allow for differential regulation between the two sectors. Addi-
tionally, this constraint will always be binding for the shadow banker in equilibrium, but not
for the commercial one. Issuers of safe liabilities already issue some equity because of Equa-
tion (2.6), so market forces may be sufficient to make the equity requirement not binding for
the commercial bank.
After the new regulation is imposed, I let the economy adjusts to a new stationary
competitive equilibrium. Assuming that the welfare optimum is to equalize consumption
between the two states, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 7. Suppose that the parameters are such that the second best welfare prescribes
κh = κ` = 1 + µ− β. If
γc > γc
and γs > γs, the welfare maximizing liquidity allocation can be achieved as a competitive
equilibrium where only the commercial banks operate. However, an inefficient competitive
equilibrium may also be possible under the same policy choice.
Under this policy, the capital requirement is binding for the commercial bank. Therefore
the issuance of equity is higher than in an equilibrium without the policy. The lower-bound
for the capital requirement on commercial banks is a necessary condition to have a monetary
equilibrium. Much like Proposition 1, a monetary equilibrium does not exists if safe securities
provide high liquidity services. The capital requirement offsets this mechanism by limiting
the quantity of safe securities in circulation and forcing the commercial bank to issue more
equity to acquire assets. The downside of the policy is that the minimum capital ratio γc may
be pushed to unrealistically high levels. This occurs when θ is large, where safe securities
provide a lot of liquidity services. Therefore, issued quantities must be tightly limited to
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have a positive demand for currency. Finally, the lower bound on the capital requirement
for shadow bankers ensures that they do not find entering the market profitable.
Unrealistically high capital requirements are the first issue with implementing this policy.
A second and more relevant one is that capital requirements may not eliminate the inefficient
equilibrium. It can be shown that, if the capital requirement on shadow banks is not too large,
the inefficient equilibrium of Proposition 4 still exists. Therefore, if the economy starts from
that equilibrium, capital requirements are not sufficient to induce a more efficient allocation
of liquidity. While capital requirements solve many of the incentive compatibility issues
that affect liquidity requirements, their implementation may only lead to a redistribution
of resources within the financial sector that leaves the allocation of liquidity unchanged.
Therefore, capital requirements are an ineffective policy tool under the lens of the model.
1.7 Conclusion
I have shown a model where households’ liquidity demands are satisfied by a combination
of publicly issued fiat currency and intermediaries issued safe and risky liabilities. As risky
liabilities circulate, consumption increases but it then collapses if the issuers of risky securities
default. This outcome is ex-ante inefficient, since the existence of fiat currency forces the
economy to keep the average amount of liquid securities constant, thus introducing more
fluctuations than what a planner would desire.
Consequently, government regulation can be used to address the inefficiency. In particu-
lar, I concentrate on liquidity and capital requirements. As for the former, they can restore
efficiency when appropriately designed, but they require separate regulation for each type of
security, which is likely to generate moral hazard if the regulator is unable to verify interme-
diaries’ balance sheets. As for the latter, they are insufficient on their own, as the economy
would stay in the inefficient equilibrium, even if a more efficient one exists.
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1.A Omitted Proofs
1.A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Solve for bc using Equations (1.19), (1.20), and (1.22). Then combine the result with Equa-
tion (1.1) and κ` = κh = 1 + µ− β to get
β
1 + µ
= ϕtMt−1 + θ
bc
θ (1 + µ− β) + β .
Multiply and divide the money term Mt−1 by ϕt−1, noting that ϕt−1/ϕt = 1 + µ and m =
ϕt−1M t−1, to get
β
1 + µ
=
m
1 + µ
+ θ
bc
θ (1 + µ− β) + β .
Replace the value of bc and simplify to get
m =
β − β2 (1− θ)− βθ (1 + µ) (1 + A¯K¯)− A`K¯θ (1 + µ) (1− β)
1− β − θ (1 + µ− β) ,
which, given the general assumptions about the parameters, is positive if and only if
θ <
(1− β) β
A`K¯ (1 + µ) (1− β) + β
[
1 + µ− β + A¯K¯ (1 + µ)] = θ¯c.
Which proves the first part of the proposition. Then differentiate m with respect to θ to get
∂m
∂θ
= −(1− β) (1 + µ)
[
A¯β + A` (1− β)
]
[β (1− θ) + θ (1 + µ)− 1]2 K¯.
Numerator and denominator are both positive, thus the real value of money is decreasing in
security liquidity θ.
1.A.2 Solution Steps for the Equilibrium in Proposition 2
Note that
E
[
1 + rk
]
=
A¯+ qk
qk
and 1 + rk` =
A` + q
k
qk
.
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Then Equations (1.25) and (1.26) both solve for the price of capital qk as a function of the
liquidity premium in the good state κh and the loss rate of default χ`:
qk =
A¯ [β (1− piχ`) + θκh (1− pi)]
1− piχ` − β(1− piχ`)− θκh (1− pi)
qk =
A` [β (1− piχ`) + θκh (1− pi)]
1− χ` − β(1− piχ`)− θκh (1− pi)
Equating the two solves for the liquidity premium κh as a function of the default loss rate
χ`
κh =
A¯ [1− β (1− piχ`)− χ`]− A` (1− β) (1− piχ`)
θ (1− pipi) (A− A`) .
Thus κ`is obtained by solving κ¯ = 1 + µ− β = (1− pi)κh + piκ`. Since in an equilibrium it
must be that κh ≥ 0 and κ` > κh, then it must be that 0 < χ` < 1 and(
A¯− A`
)
[1− β + βθ (1− pi)− θ (1 + µ) (1− pipi)]
A¯− piA` −
(
A¯− A`
)
βpi
< χ` ≤
(
A¯− A`
)
(1− β)
A¯− piA` −
(
A¯− A`
)
βpi
.
The only unknown left to solve for is the default loss rate χ`. To do so, I can solve for
the amount of securities issued by the shadow banks in two ways. First, using the shadow
bank balance sheet constraint (2.7), it must be that bs = qkK¯. Second, using the household
morning liquidity constraint (1.1) realization in the low state
β
β + κ`
=
m
1 + µ
with the same constraint in the high state and the return on securities (1.24), shadow banks
securities must satisfy
bs = β
κ` − κh
(β + κ`) (β + κh)
θ (1− pi)κh + (1− piχ`) β
θ
. (1.29)
Equating the two expressions for securities bs returns a cubic equation in the object of
interest, the default loss rate χ`. While this equation is unwieldy to even report in this
paper, it can be decomposed into a linear and a quadratic factor. The solution to the linear
term is never acceptable in equilibrium, which leaves the two solutions from the quadratic
equation. One of these solutions either is negative or implies negative value for liquidity
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premium in the low state κ`, which numerically verifies that solution is unique, when it
exists.
To determine the security liquidity threshold θ¯, suppose you construct an equilibrium
with κh = 0 and κ` = (1+µ−β)/pi. This hugely simplifies the previous analysis, since many
elements of the solutions can be solved for directly. In particular, the return on equity is
now 1/β, thus the price of capital is
qk =
β
1− β A¯
securities are defined as in Equation (1.29), which are then used to solve for the default
loss rate χl from the bank balance sheet constraint (2.7) as a function of the parameters.
However, the limited liability constraint (1.26) can also be used to obtain another closed
form solution for χl as a function of the parameters. Since the two expressions for χl are
not the same algebraically, there must be a parameter value that makes them equal in an
equilibrium. The parameter of choice is of course arbitrary, but focusing on the liquidity of
the securities returns
θ¯s =
(1− β) (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)
K¯ [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [A¯− piAl − (A− Al) βpi]
Finally, I take a numerical approach in order to verify that an equilibrium exists only if
θ ≤ θ¯s. While a closed form solution exists, it is as impractical as the equation generating it to
study it how it evolves over the entire parameter space. Thus, I test the hypothesis with the
assistance of Mathematica to span a reasonable set of the parameter space. The threshold,
and therefore the region, is much more sensitive to the discount factor β, the probability
of a low state pi, and the money growth rate µ, rather than capital K¯ and productivity
levels Ah and Al. Consequently I focus my analysis on the first group of parameters. Here
I graphically report the results when setting K¯ = 1, A` = 1, and Ah = 1.2. The shaded
region is where the equilibrium is satisfied, that is where κh ≥ 0, κ` > κh, and 0 < χ` < 1.
The visible boundary in Figure 1.1 is the threshold value θ¯s.
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Figure 1.1: Numerical Approach to the Liquidity Boundary
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The scale of the graphs over θ changes to keep the boundary visible, while the scale for
µ increases to account for the shifting Friedman Rule. Indeed, the shaded region is to the
left of the boundary, or where the value of the security liquidity is below the threshold.
1.A.3 Deriving the Equilibrium in Proposition 3
As a first step to prove Proposition 3, consider first the commercial bank only equilibrium
from Proposition 1 with the details provided in appendix 1.A.1. The only step missing is
verifying that there is no incentive to operate as a shadow banker. First compute what the
recovery rate after default 1− χ` is using Equation (1.26) to get
1− χ` =
(1− pi) [A` (1− β) + A¯β] [β (1− θ) + θ (1 + µ)]
A¯β (1− βpi) + A`θ (1 + µ− β)− A` (1− β) βpi .
Then compute the expected profits as in (1.25)
E [Πs] = E
[
1 + rk
]− 1− piχ`
θ (1− pi)κh + (1− piχ`) β ,
with the expected return on capital defined by Equation (1.22). To see where a deviation
exists, set E [Πs] > 0 and solve the inequality for the probability of the low state pi to get
pi <
(
A¯− A`
)
[1− β (1− θ)− θ (1 + µ)]
A¯β + A` (1− β) = p¯i.
The shadow bank profits are positive if the probability of a low state pi is below the threshold
p¯i, thus an equilibrium with commercial banks exists only if pi ≥ p¯i.
Now move to the second equilibrium in the proposition, where both type of banks operate.
Equations (1.25) and (1.26) pin don the expected return on capital and the return on capital
in the low state respectively as a function of the default loss rate χ` and the liquidity premium
in the good state κh. Then Equation (1.20) pins the fraction of the commercial bank assets
financed with safe securities. The complement fraction is then identifies the equity issuance
as a fraction of the commercial bank assets. Use Equation (1.21) to solve for the liquidity
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premium in the high state κh as a function of the default loss rate χ`
κh =
(1 + µ− β) (1− χ`)
1− pi .
Since κ¯ = 1 + µ− β, the liquidity premium in the low state is
κ` =
(1 + µ− β)χ`
pi
.
Plug the liquidity premia in Equation (1.29) to get and expression for the securities issued
by the shadow bank bs. Also, the liquidity premia can be used back in Equations (1.25) and
(1.26) to obtain two expressions for the price of capital qk as in appendix 1.A.2. Equating
the two expressions solve for the default loss rate
χl =
(
A¯− A`
)
[1− β (1− θ) + θ (1 + µ)]
A¯ [1− θ (1 + µ− β)− βpi] + A` [θ (1 + µ− β)− (1− β)pi] .
Given the solution for χl, check for the necessary but not sufficient condition for equilibrium
κ` > κh > 0 and 0 < χ` < 1. The inequalities are verified if either
θ <
A¯ (1− 2β)− 2A`(1− β)(
A¯− A`
)
(1 + µ− β)
or
pi <
(
A¯− A`
)
[1− β (1− θ)− θ (1 + µ)]
A¯β + A` (1− β) = p¯i
A¯ (1− 2β)− 2A`(1− β)(
A¯− A`
)
(1 + µ− β) < θ <
1− β
1 + µ− β ,
where these last two inequalities must hold jointly. The first inequality is relevant only if the
capital productivity in the high state Ah is at least twice the productivity in the low state,
and for low values of the discount factor β, thus I focus on the second set of conditions.
These define the upper bound for pi from the proposition and conditions on θ that end up
being irrelevant for the equilibrium.
To find the relevant conditions on the security liquidity θ come from solving for the last
unknowns in the model. Equation 2.7 solves for the amount of capital held by the shadow
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banker Ks, given the solution for the shadow bank securities bs and the price of capital qk.
Market clearing then returns the capital held by the commercial banker Kc. The equilibrium
condition 0 < Kc < K¯ implicitly determines the equilibrium lower bound for the security
liquidity θcs.
After determining the asset side of a commercial bank’s balance sheet, Equation (1.20)
pins down the amount of safe securities bc issued and thus Equation (2.4) solves for the
amount of equity nc issued. Finally, the household’s morning liquidity constraint (1.1) at
the low state solves for the real value of money
m =
(
β
β + κ`
− θ b
c
θ (1 + µ− β) + β
)
(1 + µ) ,
where the condition m > 0 implicitly determines the upper bound value for the security
liquidity θ¯cs.
1.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof follows similar steps as the ones detailed in appendix section 1.A.3 to prove
Proposition 3. However, I start not only from guessing that both banks operate, but also
that the liquidity premia in each state are given by
κh = 0 and κ` =
1 + µ− β
pi
.
Then the zero profit condition on shadow bankers (1.25) immediately implies
E
[
1 + rk
]
=
1
β
⇒ qk = β
1− β A¯.
Now the price of capital is simply the discounted value of the future expected revenues. The
return on capital in the low state pins down the value of commercial bank securities relative
to commercial bank capital. Then use the zero profits condition for the commercial banker
to recover the default loss rate
χ` =
βτ − θ (1 + µ− β)
βpiτ − θ (1 + µ− β) .
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In equilibrium 0 < χ` < 1, which gives a first condition on the lower bound for the security
liquidity θ
θ >
βτ
1 + µ− β (1.30)
The second part of the of lower bound is derived from the solution for the capital acquired by
the shadow banker. The solution for the default loss rate χ combined with the household’s
liquidity constraint (1.1) in the high and low state solves for the shadow bank securities bs.
Then the shadow bank balance sheet constraint (2.7) solves for the capital owned by the
shadow bank Ks. In equilibrium this solution must be feasible, or 0 < Ks < K¯, which
returns
θ >
(1− β) (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)
K¯ [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [A¯ (1− βpi)− A` (1− β) pi] . (1.31)
The combination of (1.30) and (1.31) defines the equilibrium lower bound θscτ . The remaining
part of the model is solved as in appendix section 1.A.3. Here I will only detail the conditions
such that the real value of money is positive, or m > 0, which holds true when either
τ ≤ pi (1− β) (1 + µ− β)
A¯K¯ [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] = τ¯
sc,
or
θ <
A¯K¯ [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] βpiτ − (1− β) (1 + µ− β) [β − β (1− pi) pi − (1 + µ) (1− pipi)]
(β − µ− 1) [(1− β) (1 + µ− β)pi − A¯K¯ (1 + µ− β (1− pi)) τ] τ = θ¯scτ .
1.A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Take the per period expected utility (1.28) and take the standard first order conditions to
recover the following candidate maxima for the liquidity premium in the high state
κh,1 = 1 + µ− β
κh,2 =
1 + µ− β +
√
(1 + µ− β)2 − 4β2 (1− pi) pi
2 (1− pi)
κh,3 =
1 + µ− β −
√
(1 + µ− β)2 − 4β2 (1− pi) pi
2 (1− pi)
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Looking at existence and feasibility of the solution, κh,2 satisfies the constraint (that is
0 ≤ κh,2 ≤ 1 + µ− β) if √
(1 + µ) (2β − µ− 1)
β2
≤ 1− 2pi
While κh,3 is acceptable if√
(1 + µ) (2β − µ− 1)
β2
≤ 1− 2pi or 1 + µ ≥ 2β
Since the second derivative evaluated at κh,1 is positive if 1 + µ < 2β, κh,1is the unique
interior maximizer if
√
(1+µ)(2β−µ−1)
β2
> 1− 2pi. If the latter conditions fails, but 1 + µ < 2β,
κh,1 and κh,3 are both local maxima and κh,2 is a local minimum. Finally, if 1 +µ > 2β, κh,3
is a local maximum and κh,1 is a local minimum. An illustration of the possible optimum is
given in the picture below. The left panel shows the case where κh,1 is the welfare maximizing
liquidity premium in the high state (which requires a relatively small value for µ), while the
right panel shows the case of an interior maximizer at κh,3 (which exists at higher levels of
inflation µ).
Figure 1.2: Low µ Figure 1.3: High µ
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Parameter Value
A` 1.0007
Ah 1.1
K¯ 1
τ 0.0007
β 0.95
µ 0.02
Table 1.5: Multiple Equilibria: Parameter Choice
1.B Numerical Illustrations
1.B.1 Equilibrium Multiplicity with Positive Balance Sheet Costs
Figure 1.4 illustrates the regions where different equilibria exists in the probability of the
low state pi and security liquidity θ plane. For this simulation, the parameters are described
in Table 1.5.
Note how the region in yellow, which represents the equilibrium where both commercial
and shadow bankers exist and liquidity in fully satiated in the good state, partially overlaps
with the the blue region, where the two bankers still operate, but the liquidity premium is
always positive, and the red region, where only the commercial banking is the only profitable
type of intermediary.
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Figure 1.4: Multiple Equilibria: Illustration
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CHAPTER 2
A Data Analysis of Bank Behavior
2.1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis was a watershed moment for the US financial system. Starting in
the 1990s, the financial system moved away from the traditional commercial banking based
on deposits to securitization and stronger interbank relationships.1 The main consequence
was an increase in both the leverage and fragility of the financial system, as exposed by
the events that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers. After the economy stabilized,
regulators embarked on a reform program that resulted in the Dodd-Frank act in the US
and the Basel III rules internationally.
This paper first studies how the financial industry has changed as a consequence of the
events of the 2008 financial crisis. The procyclical nature of the financial sector meant that
the first step was to deleverage the balance sheet. This is exactly how the system reacted,
yet leverage kept decreasing. In fact, data from the regulatory reports suggests that leverage
across the financial system stabilized to a systematically lower lever.2 Furthermore, the
composition of the other sources of financing as changed. To begin with, bank holding
companies have expanded the amount of deposits they collect relatively to their assets.
Secondly, they have reduced the reliance on other sources of borrowing on the interbank
1See Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, and Boesky (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2012).
2See Figure 2.3. However, the sample may be too short to determine if there has been a structural break
in the data.
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market, which is exemplified by the collapse in the trading volumes on the Federal Funds
market.
However, these trends are not necessarily representative of all the players in the financial
services industry. Looking at the disaggregated data, it becomes clear how the industry is
dominated by a handful of bank holding companies that control the majority of the assets
under management. These large players have driven the industry transformation throughout
the years. Yet, at the bottom of the size distribution there still exists a sizable number of
financial firms that operate much closer to traditional commercial banks. While my sample
only start in 2006, the data suggests that these bank holding companies never really changed
their business model.
To illustrate the factors that can shape the liabilities in the financial industry balance
sheet, I present a model where households require liquid securities to satisfy their consump-
tion needs. A public sector provides fiat currency, while financial intermediaries can choose
to specialized in safe securities, akin to deposits, or risky ones, similar to repurchase agree-
ments or commercial paper. In equilibrium, risky liabilities satiate the demand for liquidity,
but this comes at the cost of a large decrease in consumption when the economy is hit by a
negative shock.
I then calibrate the model using the regulatory data to target the composition of the
financial industry liabilities, as observed at the end of the transformation induced by the
financial crisis. While the model cannot speak to the size distribution of the intermediaries,
the calibrated equilibrium shows how about a third of the assets in the financial system
are used to back non-deposit liabilities. However, the sensitivity analysis also shows how
this fraction of assets is relatively inelastic with respect to monetary policy. An increase of
1% in the yearly target interest rate only increases the capital managed by the issuers of
risky securities by about 3.5%. This suggests that only structural changes from regulation
or from changes in demand can significantly affect intermediaries’ decisions. In fact, the
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equilibrium allocation of liquidity is much more elastic to the structural parameters that
define the household’s ability to use the banks’ liabilities to purchase consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the transformation the financial
sector went through. Section 3 then describes a model to study the intermediaries’ choice
of liabilities. Section 4 calibrates the model and illustrates how the equilibrium reacts to
changes in policy. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Stylized Facts in the Sources of Financing
In this section I am going to describe how the banking sector liability side of the balance
sheet has evolved as a consequence of the financial crises. Two trends can be clearly observed.
First, the entire financial sector has gone through a deleveraging process. This is likely a
consequence of market forces and the new regulatory environment following the Dodd-Frank
Act and the introduction of the Basel III. Second, the composition of the non-equity liabilities
has also shifted over time. The borrowing through Federal Funds, Repurchase Agreements
and other sources has decreased, relative to the assets under management, while funding
through deposits increased. Even though this trend is represented throughout the entire
industry, the adjustment is much sharper for the largest bank holding companies.
2.2.1 Data Sources
To account for the complexity of the modern financial systems, the US regulators collect
data at all levels of the organizational structure.3 For the purposes of this paper, data at
the holding company level is collected through the Federal Reserve FR Y-9C Consolidated
Report of Condition and Income form. Similar to the Call Reports collected by the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council, it includes quarterly data for the consolidated
3See Avraham, Selvaggi, and Vickery (2012) for a full overview of the data reporting
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balance sheet and income statement of each top level U.S. Bank Holding Company. That is,
only the, top-tier holding company files the report, which forces the reporter to include non
banking activities generally excluded from Call Reports. Example of such non-bank activities
include insurance and investment services, which are usually in a separate corporate entity
because of activity-specific regulatory requirements. One of the disadvantages of the FR Y-
9C is that it collects data only for bank holding companies with assets exceeding $3 billions,
therefore cutting off the smaller independent entities who instead file the FR Y-9LP.4
My sample is an unbalanced panel of 1,656 Bank Holding Company quarterly reports
from the first quarter of 2006 to the third quarter of 2017. There are two main reasons for
Bank Holding Companies to drop in and out of the sample. First, the reporting threshold
has changed throughout the years, starting from as low as $500 million of assets under
management in 2006 up to $1 billion in 2015.5 Second and more importantly, traditional
investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs or BNY Mellon, agreed to reorganize as Bank
Holding Companies in the wake of the financial crises. Therefore they became subject to
additional regulatory requirements like filing the FR Y-9C form. From this sample, I extract
the consolidated balance sheet from Schedule HC. This ensures that the collected variables
are consistent throughout the entire sampling period. While more granular data is available
regarding the composition of the assets and liabilities, the reported data has changed multiple
times in the years after the financial crisis, making it impossible to assemble a long time
series.
Once the balance sheet data is extracted, I construct measures that aggregate the sources
of funding in three categories. First one is deposits, whether they are located domestically or
abroad. Second, I aggregate the other non equity liabilities, which will be denoted as risky
liabilities thereafter. These include federal funds purchases, securities sold under a repurchase
4As I am going to detail later, these only represent a minimal part of the financial system, and there is
no significant loss for the purpose of documenting the overall trends
5A new $3 billion minimum threshold has been implemented in 2018.
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agreement, trading liabilities, subordinated notes and other borrowed funds. The idea is to
separate the intermediaries liabilities into two broad risk categories as informed by the model
I will detail in the next section. Finally, the third category is equity and is directly provided
in the FR Y-9C form. How these new variables are constructed and the variable codes are
detailed in Appendix 2.B.
2.2.2 A Snapshot of the Financial Industry Trends
In this section I am going to provide a short summary on how the financial industry as a whole
has reorganized its balance sheet in the wake of the financial crisis. To that end, I aggregate
the balance sheet of all the Bank Holding Companies in my sample and compute the same
aggregation of liabilities constructed for the individual companies. This methodology is
comparable to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Trends for Consolidated
U.S. Banking Organizations, which provides consolidated statistics on the financial sector.
According to this source, Bank Holding Companies and commercial banks were managing
$20.4 trillion in assets in the third quarter of 2017. In the same period, Bank Holding
Companies in my sample manage $19.9 trillion, or 97% of the assets captured by the quarterly
trends.
Using the measures of assets, deposits, risky liabilities and equity, I construct a time
series of ratios to illustrate how asset are funded, whose representation can be found in
Appendix 2.A. In Figure 2.1, I show how the fraction of assets that is financed through
deposits has increased substantially in the years after the Great Recession. The minor spike
between the third and fourth quarter of 2018 is the impact of the financial crisis, when the
demand for safe assets skyrocketed. Similarly, the immediate decrease in the first quarter
2009 is likely due to the entry in the sample of investment banks and financial institutions,
such as Goldman Sachs, with little deposits in their balance sheets. Nevertheless, the trend
after the US economy exited the recession period is quite clear, with banks financing more
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and more of their assets with deposits, which went from a low point of 45% of the value of
the assets to a relatively stable 57% by the end of the third quarter of 2017.
The trend for deposits is matched and outpaced by an opposite trend with respect to
the other risky liabilities. This set of risky liabilities primarily includes Federal Funds and
repurchase agreements (repo). As Figure 2.2 shows, after the financial crisis there was a
drastic reduction in the use of these sources of funding, which went from representing 45% of
the liability side of the balance sheet to about 31.5%. One of the main drivers of this trend is
the large fall in the Federal Funds market volumes that started in 2008 and continues to this
date.6 Moreover, the regulatory reforms likely contributed to the shift in funding sources,
by placing heavy liquidity requirements on risky short term borrowing activities.
The shifts in deposits and risky liabilities are embedded in a general deleveraging trend
for the financial industry. Figure 2.3 shows how Bank Holding Companies have strengthened
their equity portfolios, bringing the leverage down to 9 from about 12 before the financial
crisis. Again, the main driver for this change is the implementation of the Basel III rules,
which effectively increased the capital requirements for all the financial institutions. The
Federal Reserve approved the new regulations in July 2013, but it is clear how the financial
system had been getting ready for the change by slowly deleveraging over the previous four
years. In fact, the leverage ratio has been essentially stable since the fourth quarter of 2013,
a sign that a new equilibrium has been reached.
2.2.3 Differences Across the Size Distribution
The previous section showed the funding trends across the financial industry as a whole.
However, the US financial system is dominated by a few institutions and the trends have
been very different across the size distribution. That is, regulatory policies affect banks
and banks’ decisions asymmetrically. For instance, Davila and Walther (2019) show how
6See Afonso et al. (2018)
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large banks naturally leverage more in the presence of bailouts. To show how this variation
in the data, I isolate the top 5 Bank Holding Companies by asset managed at the end of
my sample and compare them to the bottom 10% of the asset distribution. The top 5
financial institutions in my sample are: J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo,
Citigroup and U.S. Bancorp. To highlight the changes before and after the financial crisis,
I am constructing these categories using only Bank Holding Companies that are present for
the full duration of my sample. Without this restriction, Goldman Sachs would be part of
the top 5 institutions, but data availability starts in 2009. In terms of size difference, the
top 5 banks manage slightly more than half of the entire assets in the financial system, while
the bottom 10% only manages 0.2% of the assets.
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 compare the ratio of deposits to assets for the top 5 institutions
and the bottom 10% respectively. Among the top 5 banks, there is a clear difference in the
level of deposits between those who traditionally operated in the commercial bank space
(Wells Fargo and U.S. Bancorp) and the others with an investment banking arms. For all
of them, deposits went up by the same order of magnitude of the financial industry overall.
This is in stark contrast with the situation for the bottom 10% of the asset distribution.
First, the level of deposits relative to assets is much higher. Second, while the amount of
deposits increased in within this group, the change is much less pronounced, at about half
of the industry magnitude.
A similar story can be observed in the case of risky liabilities. Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7
provide the time series of the risky liabilities to assets ratio for the top 5 institutions and
the bottom 10% respectively. Among the top banks, the ones with mainly commercial banks
operations use a relatively small amount of risky liabilities, with levels below the industry
average. On the other hand the other top banks have a much higher component of risky
liabilities in their balance sheet. All the top banks follow the general trend for the overall
financial system, with the exception of Citigroup, that started with a much higher level of
62
risky liabilities and in fact it was subject to a sharp adjustment during the great recession.
By contrast, small banks do not use much risky liabilities and used them to fund 14% of
their assets before the crisis. Yet, small banks also reduced their use sharply, cutting them
down to slightly more than 8% of the total liabilities.
Finally, Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9 compare the leverage, as measured by the ratio of total
assets to total equity, between the top 5 institutions and the bottom 10%. Here the picture
is slightly different, with similar leverage ratios across the size distribution and trends on
par with what is observed in the industry as a whole. The clear exception is Citigroup,
that started with a pre-crisis leverage ratio of 18 and sharply deleveraged its activities all
the way to a leverage of 8. The relative uniformity in choice of leverage indicates that for
bank holding companies have a target leverage ratio7 that is likely strongly influenced by
the regulatory environment.
Overall, this discussion suggests that the financial industry trends are set by a few institu-
tions that operate as complex organizations involved in every aspect of financial innovation,
while smaller bank holding companies still operate very closely to a classical textbook de-
scription of banking.
2.3 A General Equilibrium Model of Bank’s Behavior
In this section I am going to detail a simple general equilibrium model that can explain the
choice of securities issued by financial intermediaries. The model is built on what I have
developed in chapter 1. Therefore, I am going to defer a detailed description to the first
chapter of this dissertation and illustrate only the main components and any new changes.
Time is discrete over an infinite horizon. As in the new monetarist models pioneered in
Lagos and Wright (2005), each time period is divided into two sub-periods, morning and
7As explored in Begenau, Bigio, Vieyra, and Majerovitz (2019)
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evening. There is a single consumption good, which is produced in the morning of every
period and can be freely stored until the evening, after which it fully depreciates. Production
transforms a fixed and non depreciating supply of capital K¯ into the consumption good
through a linear technology Yt = AtK¯, where At is an aggregate shock on capital productivity
and the only source of uncertainty in the model. The shocks are independent and identically
distributed according to
At =

Ah with probability 1− pi
A` with probability pi
,
with Ah > A`. Define A¯ ≡ (1− pi)Ah + piA` as the average productivity of capital. In what
follows, I will refer to a realization of Ah as the good or high state and a realization of A` as
the bad or low state.
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative household, a central bank,
and a continuum of two-period lived, overlapping generations of intermediaries. The central
bank controls the supply of fiat currency, Mt, through lump-sum transfers to households.
Intermediaries manage capital, while supplying debt securities and equity in the economy.
The household cannot manage capital, thus it invests in intermediaries to transfer resources
intertemporally. Furthermore, the household is subject to a liquidity constraint, where it
must finance its morning consumption with a combination of currency and securities. These
two securities are not perfect substitutes when it comes to their liquidity value. First, only
a fraction θ of a security face value can be used to finance morning consumption. Second, a
security may be defaulted upon in the bad state, in which case it looses all of its liquidity
value and cannot be used in morning transactions. However, a default does not imply a
total loss for the security holder, since the value of the assets backing the security can still
be recovered in the evening.
I assume that intermediaries honor their obligations as long as they are below the value of
the assets in the balance sheet. Consequently, a default event in this model occurs whenever
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the asset side of an intermediary’s balance sheet is insufficient to cover the issued securities
face value. For clarity of exposition, I will call the intermediary issuing of a safe security
“commercial bank” and the issuer of a risky security “shadow bank”. The corresponding
securities will be denoted as bc and bs respectively. To create a safe security, the commercial
bank will have to issue equity nc, so that the limited liability constraint is never binding.
2.3.1 Household’s Problem
Household’s preferences are characterized by a quasi-linear per period utility over morning
and evening consumption
Ut = log c
am
t + c
pm
t .
Morning consumption camt is subject to a liquidity constraint: the household can use only
currency or securities to finance morning consumption. The two assets are imperfect sub-
stitutes in terms of their liquidity value. While currency can be freely used to finance any
morning transaction, securities use is subject to two constraints. First, I assume that only
an intermediary specific fraction 0 < θc < 1 and 0 < θs < 1 of the face value of a commercial
or shadow bank security respectively can be immediately redeemed. Second, securities come
into two different varieties. Some securities are risk free, thus they will never be defaulted
upon. Others are risky, and will be subject to default in the bad state. If that is the case,
the defaulted security loses its liquidity value and cannot be used in morning transactions.
The morning liquidity constraint can therefore be written as
camt ≤ ϕtMt−1 + θc
(
1 + rct−1
)
bct−1 + θ
s (1− It)
(
1 + rst−1
)
bst−1, (2.1)
where It is an indicator function such that It = 1 when the shadow bank defaults on its
securities. Taking the morning consumption as the numeraire good, the real value of a unit
of money is denoted by ϕt.
The asset timing follows the cash-in-advance and new monetarist tradition. The asset
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allocations that determine the morning liquidity constraint need to be made in the previous
period, before the aggregate capital productivity realizes. The household lends bct−1 to the
commercial bank and its first order condition pin down the equilibrium interest rate 1+rct−1.
Another way to interpret these amounts is to normalize the price of the liability to one at
issuance. Then 1 + rct−1 represents the face value of an equivalent zero coupon bond issued
by the commercial bank and bct−1 is the quantity issued. The same holds true for a shadow
bank issued security bst−1.
Once the period moves forward to the evening, the household makes its evening con-
sumption and asset allocation decisions subject to a budget constraint
cpmt + ϕtMt + b
s
t + b
c
t + n
c
t ≤ Wt + Tt, (2.2)
where Wt is the household’s wealth at the beginning of the evening, which can be expressed
as
Wt = ϕtMt−1 +
(
1 + rct−1
)
bct−1 + (1− χt)
(
1 + rst−1
)
bst−1 + (1 + r
n
t )n
c
t−1 − camt , (2.3)
That is, household wealth is defined by the value of the assets carried over from the previous
period minus the amount used for morning consumption. The transfer Tt includes the
real value of the monetary transfer from the central bank and any taxation levied on the
intermediaries and then rebated to the household. The monetary component of the lump-
sum transfer implements the desired monetary policy, either as a helicopter drop if the
central bank is expanding the available currency in circulation or as a tax if currency is
reduced. The realized return return on commercial bank equity is denoted as rnt . This is
a random variable and determined as a residual from the intermediaries’ profits, as I will
detail in the following section. Finally, 1− χt represents the recovery rate of a security that
might default. If no default happens, then the full face value of the risky security is paid
and χt = 0. If instead the intermediary is in a state of default, then χt > 0 and the recovery
rate is determined endogenously as the value of the assets in the defaulted intermediary’s
balance sheet.
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The household chooses a plan for state contingent consumption and asset holdings to
maximize its expected utility over the infinite time horizon, or
maxE
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtUt
]
Subject to the morning liquidity constraint (2.1) and the evening budget constraint (2.2),
where 0 < β < 1 represents the discount factor.
2.3.2 Intermediaries’ Problem
Financial intermediaries’ main role is to manage capital and to provide liquidity in the
economy. That is, they take an asset as capital that households cannot manage directly and
transform it into a different asset that relaxes household’s morning liquidity constraint. Thus,
in the context of this paper, liquidity coincides with facilitating transactions, rather than the
classic definition of liquidity as the ability to quickly transform an asset into currency with
little to no losses on its face value. Examples of assets with such properties include demand
deposits, certificates of deposit, and commercial paper.
How risky is a security is determined by the operational choices of an intermediary, given
that they can commit to a contract, but they have limited liability. If an intermediary
operates as a commercial banker, then the balance sheet needs to be structured so that
issued securities that never default. I assume this is achieved by issuing equity, an asset that
only has a residual claim to the intermediary’s profits. If instead the intermediary chooses
to operate as as shadow banks, whose liabilities default in the bad state, then he has no need
to raise equity to back security returns.
Intermediaries live only for two periods, as in an overlapping generations model. At a
given time period t there is a measure one of competitive intermediaries that issue securities
and raise equity (if needed) to invest in capital. At time t+ 1, the intermediary observes the
return on capital, repays its creditors and liquidates its equity with dividends, if any.
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More formally, a newborn intermediary has a choice between two contracts. If the inter-
mediary chooses to operate as a commercial bank, it will have to raise debt and some equity
in order to make its securities default free. Furthermore, a commercial banker is subject to
some balance sheet costs τ proportional to the size of its assets, to be paid in units of con-
sumption good. The balance sheet costs reflect the regulatory cost of the banking activity.
If instead the intermediary chooses to operate as a shadow banker, he is not going to be
subject to as much regulation and can issue risky securities that default in the bad state of
the world. Thus, a shadow banker not subject to the balance sheet costs and does not need
to raise equity.
In this environment, an intermediary that chooses to operate as a commercial bank is
subject to the balance sheet constraint
(1 + τ) qktK
c
t = b
c
t + n
c
t , (2.4)
where τ represents the balance sheet costs. The price of capital qkt is an “ex-dividend”
price, since the capital production for the current period is enjoyed by the older generation
of intermediaries. Securities bct offer a real return 1 + r
c
t promised at the time of issuance,
therefore before the new aggregate shock At+1 realizes. The return on capital 1 + r
k
t+1
and the one on equity 1 + rnt+1 are instead stochastic and depend on the state realization.
Consequently, the expected profits of a newborn commercial banker are given by
E
[
Πct+1
]
= E
[
1 + rkt+1
]
qktK
c
t − (1 + rct ) bct − E
[
1 + rnt+1
]
nct , (2.5)
where the expected return on capital and the expected return on equity are to be determined
in equilibrium. The return on securities 1 + rct is not in an expectation term, since the
promised return on securities must always be delivered in full in order to create a safe
security. Then, it must be the case that the limited liability constraint is never binding for
the commercial banker. That is, the return on capital in the event of a bad shock is sufficient
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to repay the promised return on securities, or
(
1 + rk`
)
qktK
c
t ≥ (1 + rct ) bct , (2.6)
where 1 + rk` = (A`+q
k
t+1)/qkt is the return on capital after drawing the low aggregate produc-
tivity state in period t + 1. The problem of the commercial banker is to choose capital Kc,
securities bc, and equity nc in order to maximize equation (2.5) subject to the balance sheet
constraint (2.4) and the liability constraint (2.6), taking as given prices and returns.
The balance sheet constraint for a shadow banker at time t is given by
qktK
s
t = b
s
t , (2.7)
and its expected profits in the following period are
E
[
Πst+1
]
= E
[
1 + rkt+1
]
qktK
s
t − E [(1− χt+1) (1 + rst )] bst , (2.8)
where 1+rst is the promised return on the shadow bank securities and 0 < 1−χt+1 < 1 is the
recovery rate on the promised return. By design of the contract, the shadow bank securities
never default in the good state of the world. Thus χh = 0 if the economy is in the good
state. However, when a negative one is drawn, the shadow banker will partially default of
its liabilities and the recovery rate 1− χ` is pinned down by the limited liability constraint
(
1 + rkl
)
qktK
s
t = (1− χ`) (1 + rst ) bst . (2.9)
The objective of a shadow banker is to choose securities bs and capital Ks in order to
maximize its profits (2.8), given the balance sheet (2.7), taking as given the recovery rate
pinned down by (2.9), prices and returns.
To wrap up the problem of a newborn intermediary, the decision between commercial
and shadow banking operation is taken according to the contract that returns the highest
expected profits, or
E [Πt+1] = max
{
E
[
Πct+1
]
, E
[
Πst+1
]}
.
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2.3.3 Equilibrium
To close the model, the central bank sets a constant monetary policy described by
Mt+1 = (1 + µ)Mt, (2.10)
Where µ ≥ β−1. This is so that the nominal amount of currency in the economy grows at a
constant rate. To keep the analysis simple, I am going to focus on a stationary equilibrium,
where the nominal variables grow at a constant rate and the real variables are constant.
Therefore, an equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations such that the representative
household maximizes her utility, financial intermediaries maximize profits, and the capital
and consumption good markets clear.
An important component of the equilibrium is the household’s demand for liquidity.
Under the stationarity assumption, the first order condition for the household fiat currency
holdings implies that
E [u′ (cam)] = constant, (2.11)
Where the marginal utility of morning consumption is the value of aggregate liquidity, be-
cause of the morning constraint (1.1). Since the expected marginal value of liquidity is
constant in any equilibrium, then also the overall demand for liquid securities will be con-
stant. This generates a counterintuitive effect, where an increase in the liquidity of a security
will cause a decrease in the demand for said security.
The remaining details of the equilibrium are described into the first chapter of this disser-
tation. Notably, this model allows for a variety of equilibria that depend on the parameter
choice. To apply the model to the banking data illustrated in Section 2, I am going to ex-
clude the corner solutions where only one of the intermediaries operates. While this imposes
some mild restrictions on the parameters choice, the result is not going to be affected by it.
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2.4 Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section of the paper I take the model to the data illustrated in section 2.3. First, I
calibrate the parameters of the model. Then I move to sensitivity analysis, to show how the
model economy reacts to changes in the monetary policy and banking fundamentals.
2.4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. I choose the balance sheet cost τ to match
the cost of the FDIC insurance in the United States. Banegas and Tase (2017) estimate this
cost at 7 basis points over the entire assets composition of the average balance sheet of an
insured intermediary. Then I pick the productivity in the low state A` such that consumption
must be positive in both sub-periods in any equilibrium. To have a significant difference
between a boom and a crisis, I impose the high state productivity Ah to be approximately
10% larger than the low state one. A numerical exploration of the model suggests that the
outcomes are not strongly dependent on the size of the shock.8 Furthermore, my choice
of productivity parameters is consistent with Queralto (2019), who estimates a drop of 9%
in the total factor productivity after banking crises in a panel of advanced and emerging
economies. The probability of a low state is chosen so that the average time between two
crises is 6 years and one quarter. Given that the realization of a low state is a Bernoulli
random variable with independent draws, the expected time between crises (in quarters) is
given by 1/pi. Jorda`, Schularick, and Taylor (2011) look at a panel data of financial crises to
unveil an average duration between crises of 28 years, which reduces to 15 years once the no
financial crises period from 1940 to 1973 is removed from the sample. Equilibrium conditions
imply that the probability of a low state cannot be calibrated to these values. Nevertheless,
under the calibration choice the time between recessions is longer than the approximately
8The model is robust for values of Ah up to 30% larger than A`.
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Parameter Value Source
A` 1.0007 Model condition
Ah 1.1 Queralto (2019)
K¯ 1 Normalization
τ 0.0007 Banegas and Tase (2017)
β 0.97 Real Interest Rates
µ 0.005 Federal Reserve 2% Inflation Target
pi 0.04 6 Years and 1 Quarter Between Crises
Table 2.1: Calibration: Chosen Parameters
4 years and 3 quarters observed in the US economy after the Great Depression.9 Finally, I
pick a standard discount factor10 and set the growth rate of currency to the Federal Reserve
inflation target of 2%. The set of parameters is summarized in Table 2.1.
With this choice of parameters, I then use the banking data illustrated in Section §2.2
to recover appropriate values for the liquidity of safe securities θc and for the liquidity of
risky securities θs. Specifically, I look at the end of sample composition of liabilities in the
financial sector as a whole to target the ratio between deposits and equity, and the ratio
between risky liabilities and equity. In the model, the first ratio is equivalent to the ratio
between securities and equity issued by the commercial banking sector, which is given by
bc
nc
=
θc (1 + µ− β) + β
θc (1 + µ− β)− βτ τ. (2.12)
On the contrary, there is no direct match for the second ratio in the model. However, since
the data I have takes a snapshot of to the financial industry as a whole, then it is appropriate
9See the NBER US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions
10Compared to common calibration exercises at a quarterly level, the discount factor here implies a much
higher real rate, but the choice of discount factor is constrained by the characteristics of the model.
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Parameter Value Target
θc 0.0233 b
c
nc = 5
θs 0.0405 b
s
nc = 2.8
Table 2.2: Calibration: Targeted Parameters
to consider the equity issued by commercial banks and the securities issued by the shadow
bank as the total equity and total risky securities in the economy respectively. Note that
targeting the second ratio is also equivalent to targeting the total amount of non-equity
liabilities over the total amount of equity in the model economy. The target values and the
resulting parameters are summarized in Table 2.2.
The calibration results may seem surprising, since to match the composition of bank
liabilities I need to have risky securities to be more liquid than safe ones. However, recall
how the securities in the model also represent a much wider class of bank liabilities than
the more liquid banks. Therefore, the parameter θ combines these two elements into one
constant. Consequently, the calibration suggests that there is a large fraction of deposits
that are not demand deposits. In fact, in the third quarter of 2017 the timed and money
market deposits were 2.5 times larger than demand deposits.11 On the other hand, long
terms risky liabilities are about twice the size of short term liabilities,12 which illustrates the
obtained result.
Furthermore, the general equilibrium forces in the model also push towards a calibra-
tion where risky securities are individually more liquid than safe ones. The mechanism is
the household’s aggregate demand for liquidity. Equation (2.11) defines what the average
marginal value of liquidity must be in any equilibrium. Then, the liquidity demand satiation
11This measure includes interest and non-interest bearing deposits, NOW accounts and other transaction
accounts.
12Short term risky liabilities include Federal Funds, reverse repo and trading liabilities. Long term risky
liabilities are made of other borrowings, subordinated notes and other liabilities.
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in a good state implies that the marginal value of liquidity is zero. Thus, the marginal value
of liquidity in the bad state is pinned. This is the liquidity value that currency and safe
securities provide. Similarly, the difference between the two marginal values is the liquidity
value provided by risky securities. Given that the liquidity provided is proportional to θ,
the higher its value, the lower is going to be the demand for the corresponding security.
Conversely, since in the calibration the amount of safe securities is much larger than the
amount of risky ones, then the liquidity θs of a single risky security should be larger than
the liquidity of a safe security θc.
2.4.2 Equilibrium Outcome
Under the calibrated parametrization, the competitive equilibrium is characterized as ex-
pected by the presence of both types of financial intermediaries. Specifically, shadow bankers
flood the market with liquidity in good times, such that the demand for liquidity is com-
pletely satiated and morning consumption reaches its maximum value camh = 1. However,
these securities are unable to provide liquidity services in a crisis, thus morning consumption
collapses after a negative aggregate shock.
The equilibrium outcome is summarized in Table 2.3. Approximately 68% of capital
is held by the commercial banking sector, with the remaining part in the shadow banking
sector. While the shadow banking sector is roughly half the size of the commercial banking
sector, its default causes the morning consumption in the low state to be about half of the
good state one. The impact on morning consumption is so large because the shadow bankers
issue slightly less than half of the aggregate amount of privately issued liquid securities. Of
course, the total of morning and evening consumption in the low state only falls by 10%,
which is equal to the drop in production. This is reflected in a substantial recovery rate on
defaulted securities, as the household is able to recover approximately 83% of the promised
payment. Finally, the real value for money implies a currency to average GDP ratio of about
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Variable Description Equilibrium Value
Kc Commercial Capital 68.17%
Ks Shadow Capital 31.83%
1− χ` Recovery Rate 82.75%
m/A¯K¯ Real Currency/GDP 3.9%
camh High State am Consumption 1
cam` Low State am Consumption 0.5257
Table 2.3: Calibration: Equilibrium Outcome
3.9%. This value is a slightly below what can be observed in the data,13 especially in the
light of the monetary expansion that followed the financial crisis.
2.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Given the outcome of the calibration, I now turn my attention to the model sensitivity to a
structural or policy change. In particular, I will focus on the impact that monetary policy
and the securities liquidity have on the mix of private and public liquid instruments available
in the economy. While the model has a closed form solution, and therefore all of the results
can be derived in closed form, numerical analysis is necessary to derive the intuition behind
the results. Consequently, I will use the calibration parameters to provide a baseline and
illustrate the intuition behind the my results. Nevertheless, some of the simpler expressions
or further discussion of the results are included in Appendix 2.C.
13See the currency component of M1 from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
75
2.4.3.1 Capital Allocation
Before looking at the creation of liquidity, I will study how sensitive is the capital allocation
in the financial industry. That is, how the relative size of commercial and shadow banks is
affected by policy and structural parameters. I will focus on the amount of capital controlled
by the shadow banking system, noting that the model assumes that all the capital must be
managed by the financial industry. Consequently, capital that is not controlled by the shadow
bankers must be held by the commercial bankers.
First, consider how the amount of capital managed by the shadow banking sector changes
with a change in the monetary policy parameter µ. As long as the growth rate of currency is
large enough, then capital in the shadow banking sector is increasing in the monetary policy.
Intuitively, as the growth rate of money increases, the return of money and safe liabilities
decreases. Thus, the household substitutes some of her investments toward the shadow
banking sector, which can now raise more resources and manage more capital. Numerically,
shadow bank capital is not very responsive at the calibrated parameters, with semi-elasticity
Ks,µ ' 14.03.14 Recall that the monetary policy rate µ is a quarterly rate, so an increase
of 1% in the rate roughly corresponds to a 4% increase in the yearly rate. Therefore, a
change of 1% in the yearly rate will generate a change in the capital managed by the shadow
bankers of approximately one quarter of the semi-elasticity. This suggests that the described
mechanism is significant at the considered equilibrium, but it would quickly die out as the
monetary policy parameter increases.
Now let me consider the effect of a structural change in the liquidity parameters. Unsur-
prisingly, if the liquidity of commercial bank securities θc increases, risky liabilities become
less attractive for the household, and their demand decreases. Thus, the capital managed
by the shadow bankers decreases as well. However, the effect is quantitatively small. At the
14Where Ks,µ =
∂Ks
∂µ
1
Ks .
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calibrated parameters, this can be measured with an elasticity of Ks,θc ' −0.03.15 Impor-
tantly, the direction of the effect is independent of parameters, but of course it decreases for
higher values of θc.
Similarly the equilibrium amount of capital managed by the shadow banker is decreasing
in the liquidity of shadow bank securities θs. In fact, the equilibrium allocation of shadow
bank capital is unit elastic, or Ks,θs = −1, regardless of the parametric choice. To see why
this is the case, recall that the budget constraint for a shadow bank requires it to fund all
of its capital with risky liabilities bs. The price of capital only depends on productivity and
the discount factor. But the equilibrium quantity of risky liabilities is inversely proportional
to the liquidity of shadow bank securities θs. Consequently, the amount of capital in the
shadow banking sector must also be inversely proportional to the liquidity of shadow bank
securities.
The economic intuition for why risky liabilities are inversely proportional to their liquidity
is the following. The liquidity demand satiation in a good state pins the value of liquidity
in the state. Then, equation (2.11) defines what the value of liquidity in the bad state must
be, since the average value of liquidity is a constant in any equilibrium and only depends on
monetary policy. The difference between the low and high liquidity values is the liquidity
value the household attaches to risky securities. Therefore, when the liquidity of a single
security increases, the household will need a smaller quantity to satisfy the required liquidity
value, driving the demand down.
2.4.3.2 Safe and Risky Securities
Now I am going to consider how the equilibrium amount of safe and risky securities reacts to
a change in the parameters. As the monetary policy changes and the growth of fiat currency
increases, the return on safe securities decreases, and the household partially substitutes
15Where Ks,θc =
∂ logKs
∂ log θc
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toward the risky securities. This effect is present for almost all monetary policies under
the calibrated parameters. The effect is quantitatively relevant, since at the calibration
parameters the semi-elasticity is bc,µ ' −32.1. As explained, risky securities are subject to
the opposite, but much smaller, effect. In fact, the measured semi-elasticity is bs,µ ' 14.03.
Moving on to the effect of the structural parameters, safe and risky securities are both
decreasing in the liquidity of safe securities θc. However the magnitude of the change is very
different. Safe securities react strongly, since an increase in liquidity makes them more and
more similar to currency. While a lower demanded return is beneficial for the banker, the
demand effect pushes the household towards currency. I measure this effect as an elasticity
of bc,θc ' −0.98. On the contrary, the risky securities equilibrium quantity barely moves,
with a measure elasticity of bs,θc ' −0.03.
Finally, let me consider how securities react to a change in the liquidity of risky securities
θs. As detailed in the previous section, risky securities are inversely proportional to their
own liquidity, and the equilibrium allocation is unit elastic bs,θs = −1. Conversely, safe
securities are increasing in θs, with a model elasticity of bc,θs ' 0.47. This suggests that the
household substitutes risky securities with the safe ones. However, this does not hold true
for currency, as I am going to detail in the next section.
2.4.3.3 Currency
To conclude, let me consider the impact that policy and structural parameters have on the
amount of real currency. When the monetary policy target growth rate µ changes, two
effects push the equilibrium into opposite directions. On one hand, the monetary policy
determines the liquidity value of currency, and therefore a higher growth rate will result in
larger demand. On the other hand, there is an inflation cost of holding currency, which
decreases demand. For positive growth rates, one can identify a cutoff value16 for the money
16At the calibrated parameters, the cutoff is µ¯ = 0.053.
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growth rate µ. As long as the policy rate is below the cutoff value, then the first effect
dominates; above the cutoff, the inflation effects dominates. The calibrated parameter is
below the cutoff, in fact the semi-elasticity is equal to m,µ ' 232.12. A change in monetary
policy in the considered equilibrium has considerable effects on the real value of currency in
this economy.
If I instead consider a change in the liquidity of securities parameter, the value of money
is unsurprisingly deceasing in both. Safe and risky securities provide larger returns, so the
household wants to switch to them if the liquidity services increase. However, the magnitude
is quite different. For safe securities, the elasticity is very small at m,θc ' −0.18, while
currency reacts much more to a change in the liquidity of risky securities, as measured by
the elasticity m,θs ' −5.3.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown how financial institutions have changed in the years following
the financial crisis. The industry has gone through a decade of deleveraging, sustained by a
strong increase in the use of deposits as the main source of financing. Yet, these trends look
very different when the industry is disaggregated according to the distribution of assets across
the bank holding companies. The five largest ones control more than half of the assets under
management by the financial industry and they operate as modern financial institutions
involved in all aspects of the borrowing and lending cycle, especially in the shadow banking
activities. Conversely, the smallest institutions still operate as classical banks that collect
deposits and invest them.
Then, to study how the financial sector makes its financing decisions, I introduce a model
where households demand a variety of liquid securities to finance their consumption needs.
However, some sources of liquidity are subject to default and may lose their liquidity service
value. When calibrated using the financial sector regulatory reports, the model reveals
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how these defaulting securities introduce swings in consumption that are larger than the
changes in the business cycle. Nevertheless, households demand these risky securities and
the financial industry is more than happy to supply them, since they are cheaper than equity.
Policy changes are not particularly effective to change the equilibrium outcomes. This is
especially true for the size of the shadow bank industry, whose assets under management are
basically unaffected in the monetary policy target. Only the value of currency is elastic to
changes in the interest rates. However, the model only consider an economy where financial
institutions are in perfect competition against each other. The data clearly contradicts this
assumption, and in fact it suggests the presence of a strong oligopoly forces. Accounting
for the distribution of assets and the resulting market power are the next steps to take to
develop our understanding of the links between the financial sector and the economy as a
whole.
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2.A Figures
In all of the following figures shaded areas represent recessions.
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Figure 2.1: Financial Industry Deposits to Assets Ratio This figure illustrates the total
amount of deposits issued by US Bank Holding Companies as a fraction of their total assets.
Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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Figure 2.2: Financial Industry Risky Liabilities to Assets Ratio This figure illustrates the
total amount of Federal Funds, reverse repo, trading liabilities, and other borrowed money in the
US Bank Holding Companies balance sheet as a fraction of their total assets. Source: FR Y-9C
regulatory filings
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Figure 2.3: Financial Industry Leverage This figure illustrates the leverage ratio of US Bank
Holding Companies, defined as the ratio of total assets to equity. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory
filings
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JPMorgan Chase Bank of America
Wells Fargo Citigroup
U.S. Bancorp
Figure 2.4: Top 5 BHC Deposits to Asset Ratio This figure illustrates the total amount of
deposits as a fraction of total assets issued by the 5 largest US Bank Holding Companies. Ranking
by total assets in Q3 2017. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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Figure 2.5: Bottom 10% Deposits to Assets Ratio This figure illustrates the total amount of
deposits as a fraction of total assets issued by the bottom 10% of the US Bank Holding Companies
by size. Ranking by total assets in Q3 2017. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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Figure 2.6: Top 5 BHC Risky Liabilities to Asset Ratio This figure illustrates the total
amount of Federal Funds, reverse repo, trading liabilities, and other borrowed money in the 5
largest US Bank Holding Companies balance sheet as a fraction of total assets. Ranking by total
assets in Q3 2017. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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Figure 2.7: Bottom 10% Risky Liabilities to Assets Ratio This figure illustrates the total
amount, as a fraction of total assets, of Federal Funds, reverse repo, trading liabilities, and other
borrowed money in the balance sheet of the bottom 10% US Bank Holding Companies by size.
Ranking by total assets in Q3 2017. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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Figure 2.8: Top 5 BHC Leverage Ratio This figure illustrates the leverage ratio of the 5 largest
US Bank Holding Companies, defined as the ratio of total assets to equity. Ranking by total assets
in Q3 2017. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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Figure 2.9: Bottom 10% Leverage Ratio This figure illustrates the leverage ratio of the the
bottom 10% US Bank Holding Companies by size. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total assets
to equity. Ranking by total assets in Q3 2017. Source: FR Y-9C regulatory filings
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2.B Data Sources and Aggregation
I recovered the Fr Y-9C data from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), with a fo-
cus on the Schedule HC Consolidated Balance Sheet, as measured at the end day of the filing
quarter, using data from Q1 2006 to Q3 2017. Q4 2017 was only partially available for the
sample of Bank Holding Companies and therefore it was dropped. While the schedules about
balance sheet details (such as a detailed decomposition of loans, securities held and deposit
liabilities) have changed multiple times across the considered time period, the consolidated
balance sheet schedule has not, and therefore data is fully comparable across the entire time
series. Total equity capital required some reconstruction, as older reports only include its
two components, the total holding company equity capital and the non-controlling interests
in consolidated subsidiaries.
With the fully uniformed data, I compute new aggregated variables to look at trends
as informed by the model in Section 2.3. Specifically, liabilities are separated in deposits
and risky liabilities. The deposits aggregate is given by the interest and non-interest bear-
ing deposits in domestic and foreign offices. The risky liabilities aggregate is composed of
purchased Federal Funds, reverse repo, trading liabilities, other borrowed money, and sub-
ordinated notes. Table 2.4 summarizes the full list of relevant variables with the FR Y-9C
codes. Then, the relevant ratios are computed to obtain the calibration targets and the
graphs in Appendix 2.A.
2.C Comparative Statics Expressions
In this appendix I will go over some of the derivatives that inform the sensitivity analysis of
Section 2.4.3.
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Variable Construction and Reference Codes
Total Assets BHCK2170
Total Equity BHDMG105
Deposits BHDM6631 + BHDM6636 + BHFN6631 + BHFN6636
Risky Liabilities
BHDMB993 + BHCKB995 + BHCK3548 + BHCK3190
+ BHCK4062 + BHCK2750 + BHCKC699
Table 2.4: Variables Construction with Reference Codes
2.C.1 Shadow Bank Capital
When the monetary policy parameter changes, the shadow bank capital changes as
∂Ks
∂µ
=
βθcpi (1− pi) (1 + µ− β) (β − 1) [τ (1 + µ− β (1− 2pi))− θc (1 + µ− β)]
A¯θs [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] 2 [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)]2 ;
then ∂Ks/∂µ > 0 if τ < θc and
µ >
(1− β) θc + β (1− 2pi) τ − τ
τ − θc .
If instead the liquidity of commercial bank liabilities changes, then the shadow bank capital
changes in the measure of
∂Ks
∂θc
= − βpiτ (1− β) (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)
2
A¯θs [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)]2 ,
which is always negative. Finally, if the liquidity of shadow bank bonds liabilities, then the
shadow bank capital rate of change is
∂Ks
∂θs
= − βpiτ (1− β) (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)
2
A¯ (θs)2 [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)] ,
which is always negative under the equilibrium parametric restrictions.
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2.C.2 Safe Securities
The full derivative of the equilibrium value of safe securities with respect to the monetary
policy parameter µ, the liquidity of safe bonds θc are not reported, since the closed form
solution would not fit in this page and it is highly non linear. However, under the calibrated
parameters
∂bc
∂µ
< 0
for all values of µ. Similarly
∂bc
∂θc
< 0
For most acceptable values of 0 < θc < 1. Specifically, the condition is verified if θc < 0.0005
or θc > 0.0017.
On the other hand, the rate of change of safe securities with respect to the risky securities
liquidity is
∂bc
∂θs
= − βτ (1− pi) (1 + µ− β) [β (1− θ
c) + θc (1 + µ)]
(θs)2 [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)] ,
Which is positive if
βpiτ < θc (1 + µ− β) ,
which is verified in any equilibrium of the described form.
2.C.3 Risky Securities
In equilibrium, a change in monetary policy would change risky securities by
∂bs
∂µ
= −β
2θcpi (1− pi) (1 + µ− β) [τ (1 + µ− β (1− 2pi))− θc (1 + µ− β)]
θs [1 + µ− β (1− pi)]2 [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)]2 ,
Which is a positive rate of change if
τ < θc and τ (1 + µ)− βτ (1− 2pi) < θc (1 + µ− β) .
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Similarly, a change in the structural liquidity of safe securities, changes the equilibrium value
of risky securities by a negative amount of
∂bs
∂θc
= − β
2piτ (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)2
θs [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)]2 ,
Finally, a change in the in the liquidity of risky securities changes them by
∂bs
∂θs
= − βθ
c (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)2
(θs)2 [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)] .
This is a positive rate of change if
βpiτ > θc (1 + µ− β) ,
which is never verified in an equilibrium.
2.C.4 Fiat Currency
The full derivative of the equilibrium value of currency with respect to the monetary policy
parameter µ is not reported, since the closed form solution would not fit in this page and it
is highly non linear. However, under the calibrated parameters, it is simple to identify some
cutoffs for when the value of currency is decreasing in the currency grow rate, or ∂m/∂µ < 0
−0.0289748 < µ < −0.028647 or µ > 0.0533235.
The analysis is simpler with respect to a change in the liquidity parameters.
∂m
∂θc
= − β
2τ 2pi (1 + µ) (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)
θs [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)]2 ,
which is always negative. Similarly, when the liquidity of shadow bank liabilities, the real
value of currency changes by
∂m
∂θs
=
βθcτ (1 + µ) (1− pi) (1 + µ− β)
(θs)2 [1 + µ− β (1− pi)] [βpiτ − θc (1 + µ− β)] ,
which is positive if
βpiτ > θc (1 + µ− β) .
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This condition is not verified under the parameter choice, since the opposite must be true
to obtain an equilibrium of the required form.
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